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UNEARTHING THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
RECOGNIZING INTRASTATE ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM AS A LEGITIMATE
STATE INTEREST
Katharine M. Rudish*
In Oklahoma, a person must complete sixty-credit hours of
undergraduate training and embalm twenty-five bodies before being legally
licensed to sell caskets in the state. In Louisiana, in order to sell caskets,
one must operate a fully licensed funeral establishment, defined as a place
dedicated to preparing bodies for burial. In recent years, these states and
others have faced legal challenges to casket sale restrictions by individuals
who wish to sell caskets directly to the public, yet who are unable to do so
as they are not licensed funeral directors. Courts have grappled with
whether these state regulations, which in effect restrict sales of caskets to
funeral home operators, violate the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Note explores the constitutionality of state licensing schemes that
limit casket sales to registered funeral directors. It begins by exploring the
constitutional framework of economic substantive due process and equal
protection jurisprudence. Next, this Note briefly addresses pluralist theory
and interest group theory before turning to a brief overview of the FTC’s
Funeral Rule. This Note then presents the current split between the Tenth
and Sixth Circuits regarding whether economic protectionism of an in-state
industry constitutes a legitimate state interest. Ultimately, this Note argues
that while the U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly articulated that
intrastate economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest—instead
requiring regulations to be tethered to a public purpose as constrained by
the contours of the state’s traditional police powers—the Court has
implicitly accepted such a goal as legitimate due to the deferential nature of
the Court’s review of state economic regulations. This Note thus argues
that the Supreme Court should make explicit its implicit endorsement that
economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest precisely because
economic protectionism may, in the state’s own legislative wisdom,
plausibly serve the public interest.
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2010, New York
University. I would like to thank my family and friends for their constant encouragement
and support. I am especially grateful to Colin for his immeasurable patience.
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INTRODUCTION
For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts.1
As a creature of politics, the definition of the public good changes with
the political winds. There simply is no constitutional or Platonic form
against which we can (or could) judge the wisdom of economic
regulation.2

In Oklahoma, a person must complete sixty-credit hours of
undergraduate training and embalm twenty-five bodies before being legally
licensed to sell caskets in the state.3 One also must have a preparation room
capable of embalming bodies and “a funeral-service merchandise-selection
room with an inventory of not less than five caskets, and adequate areas for
public viewing of human remains.”4

1. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 134 (1876)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004).
3. See The Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 395.1
(2011); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2004); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 235:10-1-2, 10-3-1 (2010).
4. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1213.
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In Tennessee prior to 2010,5 to be licensed to sell a casket in the state,
one was required either to complete one year of course work at an
accredited mortuary school and a one-year apprenticeship with a licensed
funeral director, or to do a full two-year apprenticeship.6 The required
coursework at the only mortuary school in Tennessee included “eight credit
hours in embalming, three in ‘restorative art,’ and twenty-one in ‘funeral
service.’”7 In addition, one was required to pass the Tennessee Funeral
Arts Examination.8
In Louisiana, in order to sell caskets, one must be licensed as a funeral
establishment, which is defined as “any place or premises duly licensed by
the board and devoted to or used in the care and preparation for burial of the
body of a deceased person.”9
These three states are among those whose courts have recently grappled
with whether these state regulations, which in effect restrict the sales of
caskets to funeral home operators, violate the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by treating funeral
directors differently from other would-be casket sellers and by irrationally
infringing on the individual liberty to engage in a trade.10
In Part I, this Note explores the constitutional framework of economic
substantive due process and equal protection jurisprudence, then briefly
addresses pluralist theory and interest group theory before turning to a brief
overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Funeral Rule. Then, in
Part II this Note lays out the current circuit split over whether economic
protectionism of an in-state industry constitutes a legitimate state interest.
In Part III, this Note argues that while the U.S. Supreme Court has never
explicitly articulated that intrastate economic protectionism is a legitimate
state interest, instead requiring regulations be tethered to some traditionally
circumscribed public purpose, the Court has implicitly accepted such a goal
as legitimate due to its deferential review of state economic regulations.
This Note thus argues that the Supreme Court should expand its conception
of state police powers to acknowledge that economic protectionism
plausibly serves a public purpose, and make explicit its implicit
endorsement that economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest.
I. THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES: A HISTORICAL
AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Part I begins by detailing the development of the Supreme Court’s
economic substantive due process and equal protection jurisprudence under
rational basis review and discusses the diverging conceptions of the limits,
5. The statute was amended in 2010 following the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
6. Id. at 222 (quoting TENN. CODE. ANN. § 62-5-101(a)(3)(A)(ii) (1997)).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. LA. REV. STAT. 37:831(37) (West 2012).
10. See infra Part II.
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if any, on the states’ police powers. Next, it analyzes pluralist theory and
interest group theory, concluding with an overview of the funeral industry
and the FTC Funeral Rule.
A. Constitutional Framework: The U.S. Federal System
In the U.S. federal system, the U.S. Constitution grants the federal
government limited, enumerated powers.11 For example, the Constitution
explicitly grants Congress the power to raise taxes, coin money, and
regulate interstate commerce.12 Congress has the power to pass laws and
regulate using legislation that is “necessary and proper” to achieve these
and other enumerated ends explicitly listed in the Constitution.13 Since
Article I of the Constitution begins by declaring that “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress,”14 by negative
inference, all legislative powers not expressly granted to Congress in the
Constitution remain the sole domain of the states through operation of the
Tenth Amendment.15
Of particular relevance to this Note, the Constitution itself has only a few
references to property rights, all expressed in general terms such as
“property,” or “contract.”16 Besides the Contracts Clause found in Article
I, which provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts,”17 most economic liberties specifically referenced
in the text reside in the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments.18 The
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments specifically
refer to property rights, with the Fifth Amendment providing that “[n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.”19
11. See ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 3 (3d
ed. 2006).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
13. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411–13 (1819).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
15. See infra notes 23–33 and accompanying text. The Tenth Amendment provides that:
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Whether and to what extent the Tenth Amendment “reserves a zone of authority exclusively
to the states” has been much debated. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 3.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“Contracts”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]roperty”);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (same).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Early on in its jurisprudence, the Court read the Contracts
Clause narrowly, limiting its protection considerably. See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at
629 (describing how the Contracts Clause applies only if local or state law interferes with
existing contracts, and thus does not apply to infringement by the federal government or to
future contract terms); James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of Contractual Rights: A Tale of
Two Constitutional Provisions, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 370, 377–83 (2005) (detailing the
shift that occurred between 1875 and 1905 from using the Contracts Clause to using the Due
Process Clause to strike down state laws).
18. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 735 (6th ed. 2009).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (differing from the
Fifth Amendment, in that it provides that “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law” (emphasis added)).
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However, most critical to this Note, the Court has at times protected
other economic liberties not found in the constitutional text.20 These
unenumerated economic liberties protect more specific rights, including
“freedom of contract, freedom to pursue a livelihood, and freedom to
practice a trade or profession.”21 To find constitutional guarantees for these
rights, the Court first relied on natural law conceptions of the “fundamental
laws of every free government,”22 the inherent limitations of state police
powers, and later used the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause to
protect substantive, as opposed to merely procedural, rights from erosion by
the states.23 The next subsections will address these approaches, and the
extremely divergent outcomes24 that have resulted throughout U.S. history.
1. State Police Powers: Undefined Powers, Unclear Limits
In contrast to the federal government’s limited authority, the states,
through their police powers, have extremely broad authority. The term
“police power” appears nowhere in the constitutional text,25 and
“[g]enerations of judges and scholars have suggested that . . . state police
power is undefinable.”26 Through these broad powers the states can
regulate for the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.27
However, the limits, if any, on the police powers are difficult to delineate.28
The classical liberal tradition in which the Constitution is grounded29
places limits on the states’ power to regulate using their police powers.30
Stemming from Lockean social contract theory, states and local
20. See infra Part I.A.1–2, I.B.1–2.
21. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 606. Also, more recently, some scholars have
championed recognizing a fundamental right to earn a living. See generally TIMOTHY
SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW (2010)
(advocating for “the right to earn a living” to be a protected fundamental right).
22. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 606–07; see also
infra Part I.B.
24. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 606 (“The Supreme Court’s protection of
economic liberties has varied enormously over time.”).
25. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 9 (2006).
26. 2 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
136 (1893) (“The police power . . . is the ‘dark continent’ of our jurisprudence. It is the
convenient repository of everything for which our juristic classifications can find no other
place.”); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 13, 255 (1996) (“We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has
been known as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is
fruitless . . . .” (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Walter Wheeler Cook, What is the Police Power?, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 322,
322 (1907) (“No phrase is more frequently used and at the same time less understood than
the [police powers].”).
27. See infra Part I.A.1; see also NOVAK, supra note 26, at 13 (noting that the
constitutional basis for police power is the Tenth Amendment).
28. See NOVAK, supra note 26, at 13.
29. See EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 16 (“[T]he Constitution is unambiguously in the
classical liberal camp.”).
30. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 16.
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governments,31 using their police powers, can only regulate for the general
health, welfare, and safety of their citizens, since only these situations
constitute “collective action” problems in which state regulation is
necessary to combat “market failure[s].”32 The assumption under this
conception is that free market competition will satisfactorily allocate private
resources, and that government regulation is legitimate only when the
competitive market cannot be trusted.33 Under this conception,34 individual
property rights could be regulated when “necessary for the public good.”35
In addition to “common pool” problems of the allocation of scarce
resources, the classical liberal tradition also justifies government
intervention as necessary to combat the market failure incident to natural
monopolies.36 Thus, common carriers and utilities were deemed proper
targets of governmental regulation since they were “affected with the public
interest” as natural monopolies.37
Nevertheless, in Munn v. Illinois,38 the Court blurred the line between
permissible and impermissible regulation by purporting to find an Illinois
statute setting the maximum price of grain elevators (which did not
constitute a monopoly) analogous to common carriers and thus a legitimate
target of state regulation.39 It is unclear, however, what supported the
Court’s conclusion that grain elevators were distinguishable from other
ordinary businesses, such as tailors and shoemakers, whom the state did not
have the power to regulate using its police powers.40
31. See NOVAK, supra note 26, at 13 (noting that the term “state police power” is
misleading because, among other reasons, it historically was local, as opposed to state,
power).
32. See EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 16–17. The classical liberal tradition is juxtaposed
against the pure libertarian position, which finds any forced exchange for the common good
illegitimate. Id. at 16.
33. See id. at 17 (“Thus, government may restrict the acquisition . . . of forms of wildlife
and natural resources that are subject to premature dissipation through the standard commonpool problem . . . .”).
34. The U.S. adopted this conception of the police powers from England, where
sovereign power was constrained by the conception of a “body politic” grounded in social
contract theory. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1876) (“[T]he police powers . . . are
nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty. . . .”
(quoting The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
35. Id. at 125 (emphasis added); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN,
REGULATED INDUSTRIES 79 (4th ed. 1999).
36. See EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 17; PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 78–80.
37. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 81–82. But see New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 302–03 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The notion of a distinct
category of business ‘affected with a public interest,’ . . . rests upon historical error . . . . In
my opinion, the true principle is that the State’s power extends to every regulation of any
business reasonably required and appropriate for the public protection.”).
38. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
39. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 78–79.
40. See id. at 80. At the time that the states were prevented from passing such
regulations, the federal government was also unable to regulate, as its Commerce Clause
powers were read narrowly. See Daniel A. Farber, Who Killed Lochner? 90 GEO. L.J. 985,
989 (2002) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000),
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2. Unenumerated Rights Protected by Natural Law Principles
In the early nineteenth century, in an effort to protect those economic
rights not explicitly provided for in the constitutional text, the Court utilized
natural law principles to safeguard certain economic liberties deemed
natural at common law.41 These natural rights precluded legislatures from
interfering with people’s rights to possess and own property, creating a
sphere of constitutional protection for rights not specifically found in the
Constitution.42 In Calder v. Bull,43 for example, the Court displayed a
willingness to adopt natural law principles as a legitimate means to render
decisions: “An ACT of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to
the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a
rightful exercise of legislative authority.”44 Justice Chase’s concurrence in
Calder, however, revealed a distaste for natural law principles45 that was
ultimately adopted by the Court as it shifted away from using natural law
principles as a legitimate means of adjudication.46 Although the Court’s
explicit reliance on natural law evaporated, this shift did not cause the Court
to enforce only those economic rights enumerated in the Constitution;
rather, these natural law principles migrated to the doctrine of substantive
due process.47
which explains that Congress the lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate a
nationwide sugar manufacturing monopoly in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1
(1895)).
41. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–88 (1798). See
generally CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 608–09.
42. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 608–09; Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 715–16 (1975) (“[I]t came to be accepted
that the judiciary had the power to enforce the commands of the written Constitution when
these conflicted with ordinary law, it was also widely assumed that judges would enforce as
constitutional restraints the unwritten natural rights as well.”).
43. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386.
44. Id. at 388 (emphasis omitted). There is some evidence that the Founding Fathers
intended to imbue in the constitutional framework unenumerated liberties using a theory of
natural law. Cf. Susan P. Stuart, Fun with Dick and Jane and Lawrence: A Primer on
Education Privacy As Constitutional Liberty, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 563, 577–78 (2004)
(discussing how Alexander Hamilton envisioned that “‘liberty’ filled the bill by
encompassing all the fundamental rights of Englishmen”).
45. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (Chase, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court cannot pronounce
[the law] to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of
natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest
and purest men have differed upon the subject . . . .”).
46. See Hon. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1514 (2011) (noting the trend against using natural law reasoning in
contemporary legal society).
47. See Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 165 (1949) (“Substantive due
process[’s] . . . true source is . . . to be found in . . . concepts of natural law which have had
strong influence upon the legal thinking of this country. These concepts, historically
separate from the English concept of due process, have by judicial fiat been grafted upon the
venerable phrase [of substantive due process].”); O’Scannlain, supra note 46, at
1515 (“Lochner, and similar cases of that age, were seen as instances of ‘natural law
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B. The Evolution of Economic Substantive Due Process
Originally, the rights guaranteed to the people through the Bill of Rights
were held to apply only to actions by the federal government and not
actions taken by state or local actors.48 The logic of this holding was that a
removed federal government should not encroach on those liberties already
governed separately under state and local law.49
Over time, the Court developed the incorporation doctrine to remedy this
gap.50 The Fourteenth Amendment, one of the three Reconstruction
Amendments, was ratified on July 9, 1868,51 and was specifically directed
at abuses by state legislatures.52 The Amendment aimed to shift the balance
of power between the federal and state governments.53 Specifically, the
incorporation doctrine utilized the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause to make the Bill of Rights applicable against the states.54 It
accomplished this by interpreting the term “liberty” found in the Fourteenth
Amendment to include, at a minimum, some of the rights protected by the
first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights.55
State economic regulations are analyzed under the theory of substantive
due process, which, like the incorporation doctrine, derives from the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.56 Unlike the incorporation
doctrine, however, substantive due process reads into the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause not just the explicitly enumerated

reasoning.’ Thus, criticism of ‘the Lochner era’ became bound up with criticism of the
natural law.”).
48. See Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).
49. See id. at 249–50.
50. See Dale E. Ho, Dodging a Bullet: McDonald v. City of Chicago and the Limits of
Progressive Originalism, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 369, 379 (2010); Richard J. Hunter,
Jr. & Hector R. Lozada, A Nomination of a Supreme Court Justice: The Incorporation
Doctrine Revisited, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 365, 384–85 (2010). The Court turned to the
incorporation doctrine after its decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, which essentially
removed the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause from providing federal
protection of individual liberties against state action. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–75 (1872).
51. See William R. Musgrove, Note, Substantive Due Process: A History of Liberty in
the Due Process Clause, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 125 (2008). The first
section of the amendment granted citizenship to all freed slaves, see id., thus overturning
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
52. The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly aims at state action: “No State shall . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
53. See David Krinsky, A Plan Revised: How The Congressional Power To Abrogate
State Sovereign Immunity Has Expanded Since The Eleventh Amendment, 93 GEO. L.J. 2067,
2082 (2005). Likewise, the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had similar goals. Id.
54. See Ho, supra note 50, at 379.
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Select provisions of the Bill of Rights proceeded
to be incorporated on a piecemeal basis, encompassing a victory for Justice Frankfurter’s
preferred methodology over Justice Black’s favored “total” incorporation approach. See
generally STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 731–33 (discussing the Black-Frankfurter
incorporation debate).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; Musgrove, supra note 51, at 125–26; see also
infra Part I.B.
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liberties found in the Bill of Rights,57 but also unenumerated individual
liberties—liberties that are not specifically found in the constitutional
text.58
The Court gradually59 turned to the term “liberty” in the Due Process
Clause to safeguard unenumerated economic liberties against government
intrusion.60 Defining what constitutes “liberty” within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause has sparked intense debate for much of U.S.
constitutional history.61 Some scholars have argued that the Framers of the
Constitution were chiefly concerned with protecting individual economic
rights when they drafted the Constitution.62 Regardless of the Framers’
actual intent, by the mid-nineteenth century, the Court found freedom of
contract to be “a basic right under the liberty and property provisions of the
due process clause.”63
1. The Lochner v. New York Decision
While the Court hinted at protecting unenumerated rights using the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause before its famous decision64
57. The incorporation doctrine has also been used to incorporate unenumerated rights.
See STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 733. In fact, the incorporation doctrine can be
conceptualized as a form of substantive due process, since it protects substantive
fundamental rights from state action, albeit enumerated rights. See Peter J. Rubin, Square
Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of
Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 842 (2003) (“The most commonplace form of fundamental
rights analysis—so commonplace that it is often treated as though it were not substantive due
process at all—is the incorporation of the Bill of Rights provisions against the states.”).
58. See Jed Storey Crumbo, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Right to Privacy—
Government Contract Employees’ Right to Informational Privacy, 79 TENN. L. REV. 417,
422–23 (2012).
59. See Morrison, supra note 47, at 165 (noting that substantive due process began
developing in the late nineteenth century).
60. See infra Part I.B.
61. See Stuart, supra note 44, at 576–78 (noting the large number of competing theories
regarding the Framers’ conception of “liberty” and arguing that “the historical smorgasbord
of choices was somewhat overwhelming, and no particular tradition of liberty is
discernible”) (footnote omitted).
62. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913) (arguing that the impetus behind drafting the
Constitution was a desire to protect individual private property and wealth). But cf.
CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 606 (describing how subsequent historians challenged
Beard’s analysis and conclusions, but arguing that ultimately there is little doubt that the
Framers were motivated in part by an impulse to protect economic rights).
63. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 606; see, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S.
525, 545 (1923) (“That the right to contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of the
individual protected by [the Due Process] [C]lause, is settled by the decisions of this Court
and is no longer open to question.” (citing, inter alia, N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S.
357, 373–74 (1918))); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 16 (1915) (voiding act prohibiting
yellow dog contracts because the act “intended to deprive employers of a part of their liberty
of contract, to the corresponding advantage of the employed”); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412, 421 (1908); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908), overruled in part by
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)).
64. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887); Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
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in Lochner v. New York,65 it was not until Lochner that the Court formally
recognized the novel doctrine of substantive due process.66
In Lochner, the Supreme Court famously invalidated a New York statute
that regulated the maximum hours of bakers.67 The statute limited the
amount of hours a baker could work to ten hours a day and sixty hours a
week, with certain exceptions.68 Justice Peckham, writing for the majority,
concluded that “[t]he statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract
between the employer and employes,”69 and thus struck down the law as
infringing on the substantive right of liberty of contract.70
Although the text of the Constitution does not explicitly protect the “right
to contract,” the Court used the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to protect such a right, reasoning that the clause
protects not just procedural safeguards,71 but also substantive rights.72 This
allowed the Court to strike down the maximum hours legislation as
unconstitutionally violating the Due Process Clause, since it interfered with
the right to contract.73 The effect of the substantive due process doctrine
was to insulate certain rights—in Lochner, the right to contract—from the
reach of governmental regulation.74
Justice Peckham’s majority opinion in Lochner and Justice Holmes’s
dissent disagreed over what ends states can legitimately seek to serve
through the use of the police power and the amount of deference the federal
judiciary should accord state legislative actions.75 While Peckham defined
the police power as “relat[ing] to the safety, health, morals[,] and general
welfare of the public,”76 Holmes’s dissent seemed to reject such a civil
republican conception of the general welfare in favor of a pluralist

65. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 64.
68. See id. at 46 n.1.
69. Id. at 53.
70. See id. at 64–65.
71. Procedural due process rights previously were the only components of due process
protected from government infringement. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 545.
Procedural due process involves the right to the legal and legislative mechanisms that ensure
fair process. See id. By contrast, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause
“provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental
rights and liberty interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
72. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62. Substantive due process has been called a
“contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green pastel redness’” because due process originally
was synonymous with procedural processes. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980).
73. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
74. See STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 736.
75. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53; id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 53 (majority opinion).
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approach, whereby states can regulate based on the will of those who
manage to wrestle legislative power.77
While conceding that the state has the authority, using its police powers,
to regulate for the health and safety of the general public, the Court in
Lochner embarked on a searching investigation of the intent behind the
legislation, revealing extraordinary skepticism about the state’s proffered
rationale.78 In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the state’s
proffered health and safety rationale,79 believing instead that the legislation
was, in fact, “passed from other motives.”80 The Court interpreted these
motives as intending to interfere with the ability of employers to freely
contract with their employees in the free market,81 reflecting the
redistributive aims of the legislature.82 The majority thus read the New
York statute as aimed at the redistribution of property, something the Court
implicitly rejected in favor of its laissez-faire economic theory.83 Because
of the Court’s belief that the legislature aimed to take away the employer’s
ability to contract with its employees, the Court found the regulation
violated the liberty of contract as read into the Due Process Clause.84
Justice Holmes dissented from the Lochner majority, rejecting what he
saw as the majority substituting its own economic theory for that of the
New York state legislature.85 Holmes wrote that his personal preferred
economic theory had nothing to do with whether a state legislature has the
power to “embody their opinions in law,”86 conveying his belief that it is
not a judge’s place to determine whether the will of a democratic majority
must conform to a particular economic theory and what that theory must be.
According to Professor Sunstein, Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner
“comes close to modern interest-group pluralism, which treats the political
process as an unprincipled struggle among self-interested groups for scarce
77. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 879 (1987) (noting
that Holmes’s dissent in Lochner is a rejection of the principal of neutrality which demands
that state legislatures pass laws of neutral application for the general welfare).
78. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58–65.
79. Id. at 58 (“There is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be
necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public health . . . .”). However, as
Justice Harlan’s dissent makes clear, the degree to which working as a baker was detrimental
to health was far from clear, with multiple sources citing it as an extremely hazardous
occupation due to inhaling large amounts of flour dust. Id. at 69–71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, Harlan argued that regardless of the danger, “[w]hether or not this be wise
legislation it is not the province of the court to inquire,” as “[the Court is] not to presume
that the State of New York has acted in bad faith.” Id. at 69, 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 64 (majority opinion).
81. Id.
82. See Sunstein, supra note 77, at 878 n.28 (stating that during the Lochner era
redistributive ends were not considered sufficiently public to justify government regulation).
83. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[A] constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to
the State or of laissez faire.”).
84. See id. at 64 (majority opinion).
85. See id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating famously that “[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics”).
86. Id.
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social resources.”87 Thus Holmes’s and Peckham’s arguments in Lochner
reveal diverging opinions on an issue that remains debated today: whether
it is legitimate for a government to act solely to advance the interests of a
politically powerful group,88 or whether state legislation must contain an
aspect of neutrality, thereby benefiting the general public at large.89
2. Business Entry Cases Following Lochner
Following its decision in Lochner, the Supreme Court declared it
unconstitutional for states to pass legislation restricting access to a
particular business.90 In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,91 the Court
invalidated an Oklahoma law that required a license to sell ice.92 The state
only granted licenses upon establishing that existing ice suppliers could not
adequately meet supply.93 The Court stated that “a regulation which has the
effect of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in
a lawful private business . . . cannot be upheld.”94 Justice Brandeis issued a
famous dissent, accusing the majority of judicial overreaching and argued
that states should be left as “laborator[ies]” able to “try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”95
Similarly, in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,96 the Court struck down a
law requiring that all owners of pharmacies, including corporate
Finding that “mere stock
stockholders, be licensed pharmacists.97
ownership in a corporation, owning and operating a drug store, can have no
87. Sunstein, supra note 77, at 879. Sunstein further argues that “Holmes’ opinion treats
the political process as a kind of civil war, in which the powerful succeed; if courts interfere,
they will be bottling up forces that will express themselves elsewhere in other and more
destructive forms.” Id.
88. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 748 (“The due process clause cannot
logically prohibit legislatures from passing laws merely because powerful groups want and
press for them. Such an approach would ultimately prove counterproductive, for, if the
courts prevent powerful groups from having their way in the legislative process, the political
pressures will be bottled up and eventually emerge in even more destructive forms
elsewhere.”); Richard A. Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27 (arguing that most “public policies
are better explained as the outcome of a pure power struggle—clothed in a rhetoric of public
interest that is a mere figleaf—among narrow interest or pressure groups”).
89. See infra Part I.D.1. for a discussion of interest group theory.
90. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 619–20.
91. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
92. See id. at 278–80.
93. See id. at 271–72.
94. Id. at 278 (“[I]t is beyond the power of a state, ‘under the guise of protecting the
public, arbitrarily [to] interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or
impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924))).
95. New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“To stay experimentation
in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment
may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory . . . .”).
96. 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
97. Id. at 108–09.
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real or substantial relation to the public health,”98 the Court held that the
law “deals in terms only with ownership. [The law] plainly forbids the
exercise of an ordinary property right and, on its face, denies what the
Constitution guarantees.”99
3. The New Deal, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, and
the Demise of Lochner
Due to the economic and social upheaval during the Great Depression, by
the mid-1930s, the Court was under “enormous pressures . . . to abandon
the laissez-faire philosophy of the Lochner era,” as many viewed
government economic regulation as essential to economic recovery.100 In
response to the political climate, the Court began to overrule its previous
decisions,101 and embraced a more expansive view of regulatory power,
both under the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.102
Constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein suggests that by the time the Court
reversed Lochner in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,103 the Court had
changed its conception of what Sunstein identifies as the “baseline,” seeing
the judicially enforced common law doctrines relating to the current
distribution of property as just as much government action as state
legislative enactments of hours and wages legislation.104 The argument
goes that the Court saw the common law status quo as interfering with an
individual’s ability to contract just as much as state legislation.105 The
Court began viewing the baseline differently, believing it not to constitute
illegitimate redistribution of property to pass laws that entitled everyone to
fair wages and working conditions.106 Thus, the legislation would serve
that public end by reining in abusive practices of employers, who were
unfairly benefitting from the common law status quo.107 The West Coast
Hotel decision rang the death knell for economic substantive due

98. Id. at 113.
99. Id.
100. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 621; LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446–47 (1978) (“[I]t was the economic realities of the Depression
that graphically undermined Lochner’s premises. . . . The legal ‘freedom’ of contract and
property came increasingly to be seen as an illusion . . . . Positive government intervention
came to be more widely accepted as essential to economic survival . . . .”).
101. See infra notes 103–09 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the factors that
contributed to the famous “switch in time that saved nine,” see generally Farber, supra note
40, at 987–95, and Mark Tushnet, The New Deal Constitutional Revolution: Law, Politics,
or What? 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1999) (reviewing BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING
THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998)).
102. See Farber, supra note 40, at 985.
103. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
104. See Sunstein, supra note 77, at 874–75.
105. See id. at 874.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 881 (“[D]epartures from [common law] baselines were no longer
impermissibly partisan.”).
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process;108 afterward, the Court was exceedingly deferential to legislative
enactments.109
There has been much disagreement in the academic literature about what
was wrong with the Court’s decision in Lochner.110 In fact, some scholars
argue that the Lochner Court was correct in “protecting freedom of contract
as a basic aspect of liberty and in carefully scrutinizing laws regulating the
economy.”111 However, West Coast Hotel did not change the majority’s
position in Lochner that in order to be a legitimate exertion of the state’s
police powers, the legislation must serve some neutral purpose112 directed
at aiding the general welfare.113 The Court justified permitting the law at
issue, which regulated the wages of working women, on the ground that
without equalizing the bargaining field between employers and employees
through legislation, poor working conditions might negatively impact the
health and morals of women.114 Thus, the underlying purpose of the law
aimed toward a public end.
In Williamson v. Lee Optical,115 the Court took an even more deferential
stance toward legislative economic enactments, finding an Oklahoma
statute that prohibited an optician to fit or copy lenses without a
prescription from an optometrist or an ophthalmologist to be
constitutional.116 The Court, reversing the district court,117 reached its
108. See, e.g., Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of
Constitutional Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 557 n.37 (1986).
109. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 624–25.
110. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 100, at 564 (arguing that while the Due Process Clause
contains substantive protection for fundamental rights, “liberty of contract” was not one such
right, and thus Lochner’s error “lay not in judicial intervention to protect ‘liberty’ but in a
misguided understanding of what liberty actually required in the industrial age”); see also
STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 744–47; cf. Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 440 (1926) (arguing that the First Congress
intended to import the English common law meaning of the word “liberty”—namely the
“right to have one’s person free from physical restraint”—into the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, and thus the clause does not protect substantive rights such as the right to
contract).
111. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 621; see, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 128–29 (1985). See generally
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2006).
112. The term “neutrality” is used by Sunstein to describe laws enacted to benefit the
public generally, as opposed to laws that benefit particular partisan interest groups’ goals,
which he calls “naked preferences.” See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1690 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 77, at 878.
113. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“The Constitution
does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of . . . liberty without due process of
law. . . . [T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the
protection of laws against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of
the people.”).
114. See id. at 394 (“[Women’s] physical well being ‘becomes an object of public interest
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.’” (quoting Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908))).
115. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
116. See id. at 486–91.
117. The district court had concluded that the regulation was irrational, since a new
prescription was unnecessary when someone simply broke their glasses and needed a
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decision by contemplating a set of hypothetical legitimate purposes that
might have motivated the law in question.118
However, the Court did not require the state to even argue these reasons
to justify the law; rather, the Court supplied them itself.119 The Court made
its deferential stance toward economic regulation clear when it stated that
“[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause . . . to strike
down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought.”120
Similarly, the Court in Ferguson v. Skrupa121 declared constitutional a
Kansas law that restricted debt adjusting to lawyers.122 The Court noted
that “[t]here was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this
Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise
or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy,”123
but concluded that the doctrine “has long since been discarded.”124 Justice
Black, writing for the majority, emphasized that “[u]nder the system of
government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts,
to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.”125 Thus the Court went
even further than in Lee Optical, seemingly finding the law constitutional
without any real inquiry into the means/end fit between the purpose and
structure of the regulation.126
Professor Chemerinsky has stated that the Kansas law was clearly an
anticompetitive law aimed at protecting lawyers from competition in debt
adjusting, in effect granting them a monopoly, and thus that “Ferguson
shows that no longer did the Court interpret the due process clause to
protect a right to practice a trade or profession or even freedom of
contract.”127

replacement. See id. at 485–86. For a discussion of the district court’s opinion, see generally
Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical,
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845 (2012).
118. See Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487 (“The legislature might have concluded that the
frequency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this
regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses. . . . Or the legislature may have concluded that eye
examinations were so critical, not only for correction of vision but also for the detection of
latent ailments or diseases, that every change in frames and every duplication of a lens
should be accompanied by a prescription from a medical expert.” (emphasis added)).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 488. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 626 (noting that “[i]n all
likelihood, the Oklahoma law [in Lee Optical] was adopted to protect business for
optometrists and ophthalmologists and was not motivated by a desire to improve health”).
121. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
122. Id. at 732–33.
123. Id. at 729.
124. Id. at 730.
125. Id. at 729.
126. See STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 758. This deferential standard stems from the
application of rational basis review to economic legislation. See infra Part I.C.
127. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 627.
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C. Current Equal Protection and Economic Substantive Due Process
Analysis: The Tripartite Framework and Resulting Deference
to Economic Legislation
The Equal Protection Clause, while often analyzed concurrently with the
Due Process Clause, derives from a separate theoretical underpinning, and
consequently requires separate discussion.128 This section first briefly
discusses the history of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and
how the tripartite system of review is used to analyze legislation under the
Equal Protection Clause. This section then goes on to discuss the current
rational basis standard as applied to economic regulations under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
1. Overview of the History and Purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
and Its Application to Economic Regulations
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause states: “No State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”129 The motivation behind the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause was “largely to protect the rights of the newly freed
slaves” after the Civil War.130 Yet the Equal Protection Clause does more
than just protect against racially drawn classifications that discriminate by
treating people unequally based on racial characteristics.131 All legislative
action involves classifying along some basis, resulting in unequal
treatment.132 However, not all laws that classify individuals into different
groups violate the Constitution.133 Otherwise, virtually all laws would be
deemed unconstitutional violations of the Equal Protection Clause.134
Thus, the challenge in equal protection jurisprudence is to determine which
government classifications result in an unconstitutional deprivation of equal
protection and which government classifications are permissible exercises
of legislative authority.135
Today, courts rarely invalidate state economic legislation under the rubric
of equal protection or economic substantive due process analysis.136 Unlike

128. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 13.
131. See id. at 672.
132. For example, property owners are treated differently than nonproperty owners in
paying property taxes, and children are treated differently than adults vis-à-vis voting rights.
None of these classifications have been deemed violations of the Equal Protection Clause,
even though they treat people differently as a result of the classification.
133. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (describing
that the Equal Protection Clause “essentially [is] a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike” (emphasis added)).
134. See id. at 439–40.
135. See infra Part I.C.2–3.
136. See STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 758 (“[T]he Court has not invalidated an
economic regulation on substantive due process grounds since 1937.”). But see infra note
169 and accompanying text.
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the realm of “implied fundamental rights,” where the Court has engaged in
a more searching review using substantive due process analysis,137 the
Court has been said to have abdicated its role of judicial review in the realm
of economic regulations.138 Viewing this phenomenon as problematic,
Professor Siegan favored elevating judicial review, arguing that the current
deferential treatment of economic liberties violates separation of powers
principals by closing off economic regulations entirely from meaningful
review by the courts.139
The Court, in its famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene
Products Co.,140 established that legislative classifications that regulate
social and economic relationships will be viewed by courts with deference,
with courts only applying searching judicial review when regulations
infringe on a fundamental right or discriminate against “discrete and insular
minorities.”141 The logic behind this formulation is that it allows the more
democratically elected branches of government to make decisions without
fear of the unelected judiciary second-guessing it, unless judicial scrutiny is
warranted for some reason.142
According to Professor Ackerman, Carolene Products “brilliantly
endeavored to turn the Old Court’s recent defeat into a judicial victory.”143
Since the era of judges imposing their own economic agenda had ended
with West Coast Hotel, the Court, in an effort to rebuild their legitimacy,
adopted the Carolene Products framework that largely deferred to the will
of elected majorities.144 This solved what Professor Bickel identified as the
countermajoritarian dilemma.145 To Bickel, “judicial review is a deviant
137. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a fundamental right to
engage in private consensual homosexual activity); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(finding that the fundamental right to privacy includes a woman’s decision to terminate her
pregnancy prior to viability); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) (finding a
fundamental right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the
education of their own”).
138. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 117, at 860 (“The modern rational basis approach
adopted by the Warren Court in Lee Optical represents a judicial abdication of its function to
police the Constitution’s limits on legislative power.”); Brandon S. Swider, Judicial Activism
v. Judicial Abdication: A Plea for a Return to the Lochner Era Substantive Due Process
Methodology, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 315, 326–27 (2009).
139. See generally Bernard H. Siegan, Separation of Powers and Economic Liberties, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 415 (1995).
140. 304 U.S. 144, 152, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
141. Id. at 152–53 n.4. The Court has subsequently characterized certain “liberty
interests” as requiring elevated review. See Lucy E. Hill, Note, Seeking Liberty’s Refuge:
Analyzing Legislative Purpose Under Casey’s Undue Burden Standard, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 365, 370–73 (2012).
142. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 678–79.
143. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 (1985).
144. See id. at 715.
145. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 18 (1962).
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institution in the American democracy,”146 as it allows a few unelected
judges to undo the laws passed by a democratically elected legislature.147
2. Rational Basis Review: What Constitutes a
Legitimate Government Purpose?
Rational basis review is the lowest level of judicial review.148 Under the
rational basis standard, a state must proffer a legitimate state interest, and
the means employed through regulation to meet that interest must be
rationally related.149 Legislation enjoys a presumption of validity, and the
burden lies with the plaintiff to show that the law “does not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.”150 This can be done in two
ways: (1) by showing that the law does not further a legitimate state
purpose; or (2) by showing that the law could not rationally serve the
legitimate state purpose.151
The Court has made clear that the ends sought under traditional state
police powers constitute legitimate state interests and are thus proper ends
of government regulation.152 However, these are not the only goals or
“ends” that states may legitimately regulate to advance.153 Rather,
“[v]irtually any goal that is not forbidden by the Constitution will be
deemed sufficient to meet the rational basis test.”154
Nevertheless, the Court has found several illegitimate ends, including
classifications which deprive individuals of their constitutional rights, for
example their First Amendment rights, or laws which violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause by preferring in-state actors over out-of-state actors.155

146. Id.
147. Id.; see also Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty:
A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV.
1287, 1290–92 (2004).
148. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 672–73.
149. See id. at 672.
150. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78–79 (1911); see also
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“State legislatures are presumed to
have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result
in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”).
151. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 678.
152. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 680–81 (citing Ry. Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (public safety); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(public health); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (public morals)). But see
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding a moral justification insufficient as
Colorado’s Amendment 2 aimed at the illegitimate purpose of singling out an unpopular
group and denying that group fair access to the political process).
153. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 681 (“Public safety, public health, and public
morals are legitimate government purposes, but they are not the only ones.”).
154. See id. at 681 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Public safety,
public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order, these are some of the more
conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.
Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.”)).
155. See id. at 682.
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Furthermore, in Romer v. Evans,156 the Court struck down a law while
purporting to be engaged in rational basis review.157 The Court in Romer
cited Department of Agriculture v. Moreno158 for the proposition that “a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.”159
The plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that the state’s interest is not
legitimate.160 This is a high burden since, as the Court emphasized in FCC
v. Beach Communications, Inc., the actual purpose behind the statute is
“entirely irrelevant” and any “conceiv[able] reason for the challenged
distinction” will be enough to uphold the legislation.161 Furthermore, this
distinction does not need to rest on any empirical evidence, but can be
This leaves plaintiffs
proved based on “rational speculation.”162
challenging a law with the “burden ‘to negat[e] every conceivable basis
which might support it,’”163 which some scholars have decried as an
impossible task.164
3. Rational Basis Review: What Constitutes a Reasonable Relationship?
Whether the law is rationally related to the legitimate end is “the most
relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny.”165 The only limitation is
that the law cannot be “clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an
exercise of judgment.”166 This means that rational basis allows both
underinclusive and overinclusive laws.167
This loose fit between ends and means has been criticized by
commentators who view courts’ acceptance of such a loose connection to
amount to judicial abdication. Steven M. Simpson, a senior attorney at the
Institute for Justice, has argued that:
[a]t a sufficient level of generality, any statutory scheme can be said to
serve a state purpose. But reciting a tautology is not the same thing as
examining whether a particular legislative choice is within the bounds of

156. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
157. See id. This type of heightened review has been deemed rational basis review “with
bite.” See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 680.
158. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
159. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
160. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citation omitted).
164. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why
Yesterday’s Rationality Review Isn’t Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457, 500–01 (2004).
165. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989).
166. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937)).
167. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 686 (explaining that underinclusive laws are
often indicators that the law is either being used to harm a particular group, or to help a
politically powerful group).
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its constitutional authority. It is little more than a rationalization for
government action dressed up as judicial review.168

Regardless of the scholarly criticism, instances of the Court finding laws
irrational are few and far between.169 Part II of this Note discusses the
diverging treatment of the question of what constitutes unconstitutional
“arbitrary” power.
D. Pluralist Theory, Interest Group Theory, and the FTC’s Funeral Rule
This section briefly explains pluralist theory and interest group theory.
This explanation is necessary for a full discussion of the regulations that
limit casket sales to funeral home directors, due to the arguments that the
casket sales restrictions are illegitimate as they are wholly the product of
powerful interest group pressures. However this discussion will necessarily
be limited, as it is outside the scope of this Note to provide a complete
survey of these theories. This section concludes with a brief overview of
the funeral industry and a discussion of the FTC’s Funeral Rule.
1. Interest Group Pluralism and Public Choice Theory
Pluralist theory views interest group participation as an essential element
of the proper functioning of a democracy.170 As far back as de
Tocqueville’s writings on the importance of “factions,” interest group
pluralism has been embraced as necessary in a democracy.171 Pluralists
embrace self-interested special interest groups’ participation in government
and view regulation of interest groups as a threat to proper democratic
process by distorting the marketplace for private political activity.172
Pluralists believe that interest group participation should be left
unregulated, embracing an “invisible hand” approach, which posits that the
best results ensue when interest groups advocate freely.173
In contrast with the pluralists’ optimistic view of interest group
participation,174 public choice theorists take a more sinister view of public
168. Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP. L.
REV. 173, 191 (2003).
169. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 687–89 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)); Sunstein, supra note 112, at 1698. But see Brief for
Petitioners-Appellees at 26–27 & nn.13–14, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756 (5th
Cir. Dec. 12, 2011) (collecting cases where laws have been struck down under rational basis
review).
170. See Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern
Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 937–42 (1990).
171. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
29 (1985); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Pluralist Theory of the Equal Protection
Clause, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1239, 1239 (2009) (arguing that the Constitution is grounded
in the normative theory of pluralism).
172. See Minda, supra note 170, at 939 & n.113 (citing Sunstein, supra note 171, at 33).
173. See id. at 938–39 (citing Sunstein, supra note 171, at 34).
174. See id. at 937 (noting the “optimistic[]” conception of politics that pluralism
provided in the 1960s).
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interest groups.175 Borrowing tools from economics and applying them to
lawmaking, public choice theory’s tenants of interest group theory and rent
seeking reject the presumption that legislatures act to serve the general
public.176 Interest group theory posits that small, organized groups gain
disproportionate177 power in government, resulting in regulations that do
not advance the public interest, but rather extract “monopoly rents” from
interest groups for the right to operate a monopoly that harms the public,
often through higher prices.178 Small, extremely interested groups gain
disproportionate benefits compared to the large majorities with diffusely
held interests, due to lowered transaction costs, such as lower costs in
policing free riding and receiving larger benefits if successful.179 Interest
group theory thus explains why regulations often do not mirror the interests
of majorities.180
Using interest group theory as a tool, some scholars have advocated
elevating judicial review of economic regulations that are products of
interest group lobbying.181 This reflects the notion that the political process
is broken due to the presence of interest groups, and that judges must
interfere to ensure that laws are passed to advance the public interest.182
This urge to ratchet up judicial scrutiny is not without critics, however.183
For example, Professor Elhauge argues that, absent some normative
evaluation of the outcomes of special interest legislation, interest group
theory cannot show that the political process is defective.184 This is
because, “[w]hether courts will find any given level of [interest group]
influence excessive depends upon the normative baseline they use.”185 Put
differently, without attaching a baseline level of what the “appropriate”
amount of influence a particular group should yield, it is impossible to
determine whether the outcome is “inappropriate” or not.186 As Elhauge
points out, a baseline of efficiency is often implicitly adopted, but using
interest group theory to attain the realization that a particular regulation is
175. Id. at 945.
176. See Ezra B. Hood, Comment, Interpreting in the Public Interest: How Macey’s
Canon Can Restore Economic Liberty, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 441, 450 (2009).
177. But see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Instrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 49–60 (1991) (arguing that finding a particular group’s
influence disproportionate requires adopting some normative baseline for determining what
that group’s proportionate influence should be); see also infra notes 184–87 and
accompanying text.
178. See Elhauge, supra note 177, at 32; Hood, supra note 176, at 453–54, 461.
179. See Elhauge, supra note 177, at 36–37; Hood, supra, note 176, at 450.
180. See Elhauge, supra note 177, at 32.
181. See id. at 32–33 (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Epstein,
William Eskridge, Jonathan Macey, Jerry Mashaw, Gary Minda, William Page, Martin
Shapiro, Bernard Siegan, Cass Sunstein, and John Wiley as proponents of a less deferential
form of judicial review).
182. See id.
183. See generally id.
184. See id. at 48–61.
185. Id. at 60.
186. See id. at 60–63.
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inefficient adds nothing additional to the analysis that a mere evaluation of
the efficiency of the regulation could not illustrate.187
2. Overview of the Funeral Industry and the FTC’s Funeral Rule
To illustrate the effects of the restrictive casket-sales regulations at issue
in this Note, this subsection embarks on a brief discussion of the high costs
of a funeral and the FTC’s efforts to keep those costs low through its
Funeral Rule.
Other than buying a house or a car, arranging a funeral is the most
expensive purchase for many Americans.188 A traditional funeral in the
United States, including a casket and vault, costs about $6,000, not
including extras such as flowers and limousines that can add thousands
more to the bottom line, sometimes with the total escalating to $10,000.189
The average casket, usually constructed of metal, wood, fiberboard,
fiberglass, or plastic, costs around $2,000, while some mahogany, bronze,
or copper caskets can cost up to $10,000.190 With over two million funerals
a year nationwide,191 funeral preparation is a multibillion dollar industry.192
In the 1980s, the FTC promulgated regulations for consumer protection
against unfair and deceptive practices in the funeral industry.193 Known as
the Funeral Rule, the FTC regulations require price lists to be distributed to
consumers in an effort to create transparency in pricing and to prevent
abusive “bundling” of products and services within the industry.194 The
Funeral Rule contemplates casket sales by nonfuneral provider195 thirdparty sellers.196 In 1994, the FTC amended the Funeral Rule to expressly
disallow the charging of casket handling fees when consumers opted to
187. See id. at 54–55. Elhauge uses this same analysis to conclude that using antitrust
capture theory to justify more searching judicial review is similarly flawed. See id. at 46–47.
188. See FTC Funeral Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,260, 42,260 (Sept. 24, 1982) (codified as
amended at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453). See generally, Asheesh Agarwal & Jerry Ellig, Buried
Online: State Laws That Limit E-commerce in Caskets, 14 ELDER L.J. 283 (2006) (detailing
the funeral industry as it existed in 2006).
189. See Funerals: A Consumer Guide, FTC (June 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro19.shtm.
190. See id.
191. See id.; see also Deaths and Morality, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012)
(stating that there were 2,437,163 deaths in 2009).
192. Statistics, NAT’L FUNERAL DIRECTORS ASS’N, http://www.nfda.org/mediacenter/statisticsreports.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (stating that funeral arranging and
cremation was a $11.95 billion dollar industry in 2007).
193. See 16 C.F.R. § 453.1–.9 (2012).
194. See FTC Funeral Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,260, 42,269, 42,281 (Sept. 24, 1982)
(codified as amended at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453).
195. The Funeral Rule defines “funeral provider” as “any person, partnership or
corporation that sells or offers to sell funeral goods and funeral services to the public.” 16
C.F.R. § 453.1(i) (emphasis added).
196. See Brief for the FTC As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6–7 & n.9, St.
Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2011) (citing 16 C.F.R.
§ 453.2(b)(D)(1)).
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purchase caskets from third-party sellers.197 By eliminating such fees, the
FTC aimed to foster a more competitive environment whereby consumers
would not be deterred from purchasing caskets through independent thirdparty retailers by the imposition of excessive handling fees.198
Acknowledging that third-party sellers pose a substantially lesser threat to
competition, in 2008, the FTC declined to extend the coverage of the
Funeral Rule to third-party casket and urn sellers, concluding that the lack
of abuses by such sellers rendered the imposition of the rule unnecessary.199
II. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER CASKET-SALE RESTRICTIONS:
IS ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM A LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST?
Part I discussed the history of substantive due process and equal
protection jurisprudence and showed how under rational basis review, most
economic regulations are upheld. Part II examines the casket sales
restriction cases that bring to the forefront the current circuit split over
whether intrastate economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest. Part
II.A discusses the arguments employed by courts that have upheld the
constitutionality of the funeral home regulations by finding them rationally
related to legitimate state interests other than pure intrastate economic
protectionism. Part II.B discusses the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Craigmiles
v. Giles,200 which held that intrastate economic protectionism is not a
legitimate state interest, before turning to the Fifth Circuit’s recent
treatment of the issue in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille.201 Part II.C analyzes
the arguments presented by the Tenth Circuit in Powers v. Harris,202 which
led to its conclusion that intrastate economic protectionism constitutes a
legitimate state interest.203
197. See 1994 FTC Funeral Rule Amendment, 59 Fed. Reg. 1592 (Jan. 11, 1994)
(amending 16 C.F.R. pt. 453). Both the originally promulgated Funeral Rule and the
subsequent amendments withstood legal challenge on various grounds by funeral operators.
See Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass’n v. FTC, 41 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1994); Harry & Bryant Co. v. FTC,
726 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1984).
198. See 1994 FTC Funeral Rule Amendment, 59 Fed. Reg. at 1593. But see Judith A.
Chevalier & Fiona M. Scott Morton, State Casket Sales Restrictions: A Pointless
Undertaking?, 51 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2008) (producing a study suggesting a “one-monopolyrent” hypothesis to explain funeral goods and services, whereby when competition emerges
among casket sellers, the cost of other funeral services rises, leaving no economic savings
for consumers).
199. See 2008 FTC Funeral Rule Amendment, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,740, 13,742 (Mar. 14,
2008) (amending 16 C.F.R. pt. 453) (finding “insufficient evidence that . . . third-party
sellers of funeral goods are engaged in widespread unfair or deceptive acts or practices”).
200. 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
201. No. 11-30756, 2012 WL 5207465 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2012).
202. 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 554 U.S. 920 (2005).
203. This Note centers on the casket-sales regulations to examine the issue of whether
economic protectionism of an intrastate industry is a legitimate state interest. While courts
have discussed this issue in other regulatory contexts, most notably the Ninth Circuit in
Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 992 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “economic
protectionism for its own sake, regardless of its relation to the common good, cannot be said
to be in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest”), discussion of such cases is
outside the scope of this Note.
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A. Legitimate State Interests Other Than Intrastate
Economic Protectionism Employed To Uphold the Constitutionality of
the Casket-Sales Regulations
Before embarking on an analysis of the arguments concerning the
primary question addressed in this Note, namely, whether legislating with
the purpose of protecting an in-state industry from competition represents a
legitimate exercise of the states’ police powers, it is important to discuss the
arguments employed by courts that have upheld the regulations without
reaching this central question. These decisions relied on finding the
regulations rationally related to other legitimate state interests besides
intrastate economic protectionism, therefore supporting the conclusion of
constitutionality, such as the state’s interest in protecting the health and
safety of its citizens and the state’s interest in consumer protection.204
While all of the cases addressed in this Note concede that consumer
protection and promoting health and safety are legitimate state interests,205
the following courts relied on those state interests to uphold the laws. In
contrast, the courts discussed in Part II.B and II.C of this Note relied on the
state interest in economic protectionism to either uphold or strike down the
regulations.206
Some courts have used the states’ general interest in regulating the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens to uphold the constitutionality of
the funeral merchandise regulations, by finding the regulations rationally
related to that end. In Guardian Plans Inc. v. Teague,207 for example, the
Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia funeral-licensing scheme as
constitutionally promoting the legitimate state interest of public health and
safety.208
The Virginia regulation at issue limited the making of funeral
arrangements, including selling supplies, to those licensed by the state in
the funeral service profession.209 The plaintiffs challenged the Virginia

204. See, e.g., Guardian Plans Inc. v. Teague, 870 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1989) (public health
and safety); N.C. Bd. of Mortuary Sci. v. Crown Mem’l Park, L.L.C., 590 S.E.2d 467, 471
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that “seeking to protect pre-need consumer funds for funeral
merchandise is a legitimate interest” and that the North Carolina pre-need casket sales
regulation rationally related to that interest); State Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Dirs. v.
Stone Casket Co., 976 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (same).
205. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (noting
that both protecting the funeral consumer and protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the
public “are clearly legitimate governmental interests”).
206. See infra Part II.B–C.
207. 870 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1989).
208. Id. at 126–27.
209. See id. at 125 (“[Practice of Funeral Services] shall also mean the engagement of
making arrangements for funeral service, selling funeral supplies to the public or making
financial arrangements for the rendering of such services or the sale of such supplies.”
(emphasis omitted) (citing VA. CODE ANN. 54-260.67(2))). The statute today reads:
“Practice of funeral services” means engaging in the care and disposition of the
human dead, the preparation of the human dead for the funeral service, burial or
cremation, the making of arrangements for the funeral service or for the financing
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regulation as unconstitutional on vagueness, due process, and equal
protection grounds.210 In its equal protection and due process analysis, the
Teague court did not reach the question of whether economic protectionism
can be a legitimate state interest. Rather, the appellants conceded that the
Virginia legislature’s interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of
its citizens by regulating the funeral home industry is “well recognized.”211
Thus, the Court found that the legislature could have “rationally determined
that keeping the arrangement of funerals in the hands of licensed funeral
professionals would benefit the public by ensuring competence in funeral
arrangement.”212
The appellants had argued that it is “ludicrous to require a salesperson,
who does nothing more than make preneed arrangements, to have the same
credentials as a full-fledged funeral director.”213 The appellants had further
argued that proof of the irrationality of the regulation was imbued in the
fact that although the regulation was designed to protect consumers, it was
in fact anti-consumer by “restricting consumer choice in this traditionally
anti-competitive market.”214 The Fourth Circuit rejected appellants’
arguments, classifying them as mere disagreement with the legislature’s
“judgment in refusing to establish different licensure requirements for
persons who do nothing more than arrange funerals,”215 which the Supreme
Court has rejected with regard to other professions.216 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that “[o]ur inquiry ends here. The wisdom of [the licensure
requirements] is simply irrelevant.”217 Thus, the Fourth Circuit deferred to
the state’s judgment regarding the best means to achieve its interest in
public health and safety. Moreover, the court did not embark on a
searching review of those means, instead finding the arguably loose “fit”
between the ends and means of the regulation sufficient to pass
constitutional muster.218

of the funeral service and the selling or making of financial arrangements for the
sale of funeral supplies to the public.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2800 (2011).
210. See Teague, 870 F.2d at 125.
211. Id. at 126.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. Teague cites Lee Optical as “uph[olding] requirement that only a licensed
optometrist or ophthalmologist may refit old lenses into new frames”; England v. Louisiana
State Board of Medical Examiners, 246 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. La. 1965), aff’d, 384 U.S. 885
(1966), as “uph[olding] requirement that chiropractors must have a full medical license”; and
Sutker v. Illinois State Dental Society, 808 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1986), as “uph[olding]
requirement that only licensed dentists could fit dentures.” See Teague, 870 F.2d at 126.
217. Teague, 870 F.2d at 126.
218. But see Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 34–35 & n.21, St. Joseph Abbey v.
Castille, No. 11-30756 (5th Cir. Dec. 12, 2011) (distinguishing Teague as involving funeral
arranging on a pre-need basis, and including complex financial transactions such as holding
money in trust).
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Similarly, in State Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors v. Stone
Casket Co.,219 an Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed a due process
and equal protection challenge to Oklahoma’s funeral licensing scheme by
finding the regulation rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
regulating health and safety.220 The court in Stone Casket reached this
conclusion by finding that Oklahoma had a legitimate interest in regulating
funeral services, since funeral services are related to the preparation and
disposal of human remains, and “[s]uch laws protect the public health and
safety of the citizens of Oklahoma.”221 The court also found that “[c]askets
are directly involved in the burial of human remains,”222 thus also
promoting the health and safety of the citizens of the state. The court
upheld the requirement that casket sellers be licensed by the state, reasoning
that “[a] casket is a part of the funeral service business and cannot be
separated as an independent item.”223 The court found that the state had the
legitimate power to protect the health and safety of its citizens and further
found the funeral regulations to be rationally related to that end by
promoting sanitation.224 Notably, the court focused on the state’s power to
regulate the funeral industry generally, and then accorded the state
deference to their means of doing so, and thus endorsed limiting casket
sales to those licensed by the state.225
B. Courts Finding That Pure Economic Protectionism Is Not a
Legitimate State Interest
This section centers on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Craigmiles, which
struck down Tennessee’s regulation limiting the sales of caskets to funeral
directors under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. This section
also discusses the Fifth Circuit’s recent treatment of these similar
regulations in St. Joseph Abbey.
1. Sixth Circuit: Craigmiles v. Giles
Craigmiles involved a due process and equal protection challenge226 to
the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act (FDEA). The FDEA
219. 976 P.2d 1074 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
220. See id. at 1076. This case involved a challenge in state court to the same regulations
(OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 396.1. (2011)) later adjudicated in federal court in Powers. See supra
Part II.C.
221. Stone Casket, 976 P.2d at 1076.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See id. (“[W]e hold that the manufacture and sale of caskets is part and parcel of the
funeral service business, and regulating that business and licensing qualified persons
engaged therein is a proper exercise of the police power of the State . . . .”).
226. The plaintiffs also argued that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002).
Unlike the district court, which rejected the argument, the Tenth Circuit failed to reach the
issue, simply noting that the clause has been largely dormant since the Slaughter-House
Cases. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004). But see Saenz v. Roe,
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was originally passed in 1951, but was amended in 1972 by the Tennessee
General Assembly to include the retailing of funeral merchandise in the
definition of “funeral directing.”227 The statute required228 those engaged
in funeral directing to either complete one year of course work at an
accredited mortuary school and a one-year apprenticeship with a licensed
funeral director, or to do a full two-year apprenticeship.229 The required
coursework at the only mortuary school in Tennessee included “eight credit
hours in embalming, three in ‘restorative art,’ and twenty-one in ‘funeral
service.’”230 In addition, one was required to pass the Tennessee Funeral
Arts Examination.231
The plaintiffs were engaged in the business of selling caskets and other
funeral merchandise through two independent retail stores located in
Tennessee.232 The Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers issued a
cease and desist letter, demanding that the plaintiffs stop selling caskets and
other funeral merchandise.233 The Board declared that the plaintiffs were
engaged in “funeral directing” by selling such merchandise and argued that
since the plaintiffs were not licensed funeral directors, they had violated the
FDEA.234 Both stores subsequently ceased operations.235
The plaintiffs sued in the Eastern District of Tennessee, seeking an
injunction against the enforcement of the FDEA against those businesses
only selling funeral merchandise.236 The court held that the FDEA, as
applied to the plaintiffs’ businesses, violated equal protection and due
process.237 After enjoining the enforcement of the FDEA as applied to the
plaintiffs, the plaintiffs resumed the operation of their businesses.238
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision, applying rational basis to review
the constitutionality of the FDEA under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, as the parties had conceded that this was the correct

526 U.S. 489, 501–04 (1999) (using the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect the right
of citizens to travel across state lines); id. at 527–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (indicating a
willingness to reexamine the Privileges or Immunities Clause in a future case through the
lens of original intent).
227. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222 (citing TENN. CODE. ANN. § 62-5-101(6)(A)(ii)
which stated that “funeral directing” consisted of the “[m]aking of arrangements to provide
for funeral services, the selling of funeral merchandise, the making of financial arrangements
for the rendering of the services, [and/or] the sale of such merchandise.”).
228. The statute was amended in 2010 following the Sixth Circuit’s disposition of this
case.
229. See id. (quoting TENN. CODE. ANN. § 62-5-101(a)(3)(A)(ii) (1997)).
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. Id. at 222–23.
233. Id. at 223.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 667 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
238. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223.
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level of review for an economic regulation.239 The court noted that,
regardless of the strong presumption under the rational basis standard that
the law was legitimate, the district court had found that the regulation was
not rationally related to a governmental purpose, as the district court
believed that the law “was designed only for the economic protection of
funeral home operators.”240 Citing the classic Dormant Commerce Clause
decision of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey241 for the proposition that
“[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete interest
group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental
purpose,”242 the court rejected out of hand the argument that economic
protectionism can be a legitimate state interest.243
The State did not offer pure economic protectionism of the funeral
directors as the objective of its law; rather, the court read between the lines,
concluding that the state’s proffered justifications were so weak244 that the
law must have been motivated by an attempt to isolate the funeral home
industry from competition:245 “we are left with the . . . obvious illegitimate
purpose to which the licensure provision is very well tailored.”246 The
court felt that “Tennessee’s justifications for the 1972 amendment [came]
close to striking us with ‘the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead
fish,’ a level of pungence almost required to invalidate a statute under
rational basis review.”247 The court noted that while “[o]nly a handful of
provisions have been invalidated for failing rational basis review. . . . [t]his
case should be among [that] handful.”248 Thus the court inquired into the
real motivation behind the regulation, and, finding it motivated by
protecting special interests, equated such motivation with the motivation
discovered by the Court in Romer and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center249: that of “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group.”250
239. Id. at 224 (“While feared by many, morticians and casket retailers have not achieved
the protected status that requires a higher level of scrutiny under our Equal Protection
jurisprudence. Although the licensing requirement has disrupted the plaintiffs’ businesses,
the regulations do not affect any right now considered fundamental and thus requiring more
significant justification.”).
240. Id.
241. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
242. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224 (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
525 (1949), and Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400
(1983)).
243. See id. at 224–25.
244. See infra notes 251–63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state’s
proffered purposes.
245. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225.
246. Id. at 228.
247. Id. at 225 (quoting United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434, 447 (6th Cir. 2001))
(citations omitted).
248. Id. at 225.
249. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
250. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at
225.
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The court proceeded to analyze whether the FDEA bore a rational
relationship to any legitimate government purpose other than protecting the
The State proffered two
funeral director’s economic interests.251
governmental interests as the purpose of the law: (1) promoting health and
The court examined both
safety and (2) consumer protection.252
justifications and found the regulation not rationally related to either end.253
With respect to the health and safety rationale, the court conceded that
the quality of a casket has the potential to impact public health in that leaky
caskets could potentially cause substances to contaminate ground water and
harm the public.254 However, the court rejected this rationale after finding
that the state does not regulate the particular types of permissible casket
designs, and in fact does not require that a casket be used at all.255 The
Sixth Circuit noted that “[t]he district court determined that there was no
evidence of any public safety risk from a leaky casket, or mere ‘box’ for
human remains.”256 Thus, the court concluded that any regulation
restricting casket sales to funeral home operators was not rationally related
to protecting the public welfare.257 In fact, the court suggested that the
regulations restricting casket sales might actually decrease public health and
safety, since restricting competition in the casket market generally drives up
prices, making the more protective caskets potentially unaffordable and
leading to consumer purchases of lesser quality caskets.258
The State also argued that the regulation was needed in order to protect
consumers, since the FDEA regulates the conduct of funeral directors by
“preventing them from making fraudulent misrepresentations, making
solicitations after death or when death is imminent, or selling a previously
used casket.”259 The state argued that if casket sellers are not licensed
funeral directors, then the state cannot prevent them from engaging in these
types of behaviors.260 The court rejected this argument, stating that the Act
251. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 226.
254. See id. at 225. In Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D. Miss.
2000), the State argued along similar lines that the Mississippi funeral licensing scheme
promoted the prompt disposition of human remains. The court ultimately rejected this
argument. Id. at 438.
255. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225; see also Casket Royale, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 439
(rejecting a consumer protection argument where “the Mississippi legislature has not seen fit
to prescribe guidelines for the quality of caskets”).
256. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226 (citing Craigmiles v. Giles, 100 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662–
63 (E.D. Tenn. 2000)). Thus the Craigmiles court diverged from the courts cited in Part II.A
supra, which found similar regulations to be rationally related to the promotion of public
health and safety.
257. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226.
258. See id.; see also Casket Royale, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 440 (“As a result of [the
restriction of casket sales], consumers in Mississippi are offered fewer choices when it
comes to selecting a casket . . . one is forced to pay higher prices in a far less competitive
environment.”).
259. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226 (citing TENN. CODE. ANN. § 62-5-317(a)(2)).
260. Id.
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already applies generally to casket retailers and, even if it did not, the State
could easily pass or amend legislation making the regulations apply to
casket retailers as well.261 The court also rejected the similar argument that
the licensing was required in order to ensure compliance with the FTC
Funeral Rule, noting that the Funeral Rule is already generally applicable to
casket retailers262 and, furthermore, independent casket retailers generally
have the effect of stimulating competition and promoting transparency of
pricing—central policies that the FTC Funeral Rule was designed to
promote.263
Departing from the usual level of deference prescribed for rational basis
review, the court infused its discussion of consumer protection with an
analysis of something that is usually reserved for a higher level of
scrutiny—whether there are less restrictive alternatives to achieve the same
legislative result.264 The court wrote that “[i]f consumer protection were
the aim of the 1972 Amendment, the General Assembly had several direct
means of achieving that end.”265 In doing so, the court diverged in its
conception of the degree to which the statute can only incidentally relate to
the legitimate end.266 Seeing the “pretextual” nature of the legislature’s
proffered justifications, the court preemptively defended a foreseeable
argument of “Lochnering”: “We are not imposing our view of a wellfunctioning market on the people of Tennessee. Instead, we invalidate only
the General Assembly’s naked attempt to raise a fortress protecting the
monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers.”267 Thus the
court found the law not aimed at a legitimate end, and therefore unable to
withstand its more searching variant of rational basis review.268
2. Fifth Circuit: St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille
Very recently in St. Joseph Abbey, the Fifth Circuit confronted due
process and equal protection challenges to restrictive casket-sales
regulations.269 Preceding the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, the Eastern District of
Louisiana permanently enjoined Louisiana from enforcing its Embalming
and Funeral Directors Act.270 Unlike Powers, where the court sua sponte
261. Id.
262. See id. at 227 (noting that the FTC Funeral Rule already applies to “any person,
partnership, or corporation that sells or offers to sell funeral goods or funeral service to the
public.” (emphasis added) (quoting C.F.R. § 453.1(i))).
263. See id. See generally FTC Funeral Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,260 (Sept. 24, 1982)
(codified as amended at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453) (detailing the purpose of the FTC Funeral Rule).
264. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228.
265. Id.
266. But cf. Guardian Plans Inc. v. Teague, 870 F.2d 123, 126 (1989) (quoting
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)).
267. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229.
268. Id.
269. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756, 2012 WL 5207465 (5th Cir. Oct. 23,
2012).
270. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149, 160–61 (E.D. La. 2011); see
also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:831 (West 2012). Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, there
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tackled the argument that economic protectionism could constitute a
legitimate state interest, in St. Joseph Abbey, the State advanced both
consumer protection and economic protectionism as potential legitimate
state interests.271 In addressing the question of whether economic
protectionism can constitute a legitimate state interest, the court tracked the
arguments advanced by the Craigmiles court, as well as the Powers
concurrence, and rejected those arguments.272
The Fifth Circuit, however, punted273 on the constitutional questions by
citing the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to defer ruling and instead
certified an issue of state law to the Louisiana Supreme Court.274 The
question posed to the supreme court was whether the Louisiana State Board
of Embalmers and Funeral Directors had statutory authority under state law
to regulate the selling of caskets by those unrelated to the funeral
industry.275
Despite the fact that the constitutional questions were not reached, the
decision delved substantively into the constitutional arguments.276 Such an
approach indicates that if the Louisiana Supreme Court finds statutory
support for the Board’s ability to regulate the use of caskets by those not
otherwise connected to the funeral industry, the Fifth Circuit will likely
strike down the regulations on constitutional grounds.277
This is evidenced in the Fifth Circuit’s language of “doubt”278: the court
“doubt[ed]”279 that the Louisiana regulations were rationally related to
either consumer protection280 or health and safety281 justifications. As to
were two legislative attempts, in 2008 and 2010, to exempt the plaintiff monks from the
casket sale restrictions, both of which were defeated by funeral directors and industry
lobbyists. See Ramon Antonio Vargas, Monks Sue To Build, Sell Caskets, HOUS. CHRON.
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.chron.com/life/houston-belief/article/Monks-sue-to-build-sellcaskets-1709363.php.
271. See St. Joseph Abbey, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 151–52.
272. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 10-2717, 2011 WL 1361425 (E.D. La. Apr. 8,
2011) (denying motion to dismiss). For a similar case, see Peachtree Caskets Direct, Inc. v.
State Board of Funeral Service of Georgia, No. Civ.1:98-CV-3084, 1999 WL 33651794, at
*1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 1999).
273. Debra Cassens Weiss, 5th Circuit Appears To Favor Monks Challenging Casket
Restrictions, But Punts Issue to La. Supremes, ABA J. (Oct. 23, 2012, 5:30 AM), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/5th_circuit_certifies_casket_sale_question_to_louisiana_
supreme_court/.
274. St. Joseph Abbey, 2011 WL 1361425, at *9.
275. Id. at *11.
276. For this reason, Judge Haynes issued a concurrence, believing it unnecessary to
discuss the constitutional issues beyond “not[ing] that there are substantial federal
constitutional questions presented.” Id. (Haynes, J., concurring).
277. Id. at *3 (“After examining the record, we have doubts about the constitutionality of
the State Board’s regulation of intrastate casket sales.”); see Sam Favate, Fifth Circuit:
Louisiana Rule on Casket Sales “Must Not Be Irrational,” WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Oct. 24,
2012, 12:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/10/24/fifth-circuit-louisiana-rule-on-casketsales-must-not-be-irrational/ (noting the Fifth Circuit “criticized the regulation”).
278. St. Joseph Abbey, 2011 WL 1361425, at *3.
279. Id. at *6, *8.
280. Id. at *5–7.
281. Id. at *7–8.
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the health and safety justification, the court noted how the State does not
require the use of a particular type of casket, that caskets be sealed, or even
the use of a casket at all at burial, thus negating the argument that the
regulation is rationally related to aiding public health.282
Most notably for purposes of this Note, the Fifth Circuit sided with the
Craigmiles court on the issue of economic favoritism, writing in dicta that
“neither precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere economic
protection of a pet industry is a legitimate governmental purpose.”283
However, the court noted that “economic protection, that is favoritism, . . .
[if] supported by a post hoc perceived rationale”284 may be upheld, but
without such a rationale, “it is aptly described as a naked transfer of
wealth.”285 The court reasoned that “naked economic preferences are
impermissible to the extent that they harm consumers,”286 indicating that
the regulations at issue impermissibly harmed consumers through higher
prices. 287
C. The Tenth Circuit in Powers v. Harris: Economic Protectionism Is a
Legitimate State Interest
The plaintiffs in Powers—individuals who wished to sell caskets online
in the state of Oklahoma without obtaining a license288—sued members of
the Oklahoma State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, seeking
declaratory relief.289 After losing in the Western District of Oklahoma, the
plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the Oklahoma
licensing law violated the Privileges or Immunities, Equal Protection, and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.290 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court.291
The Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act (FSLA) requires that any
individual selling funeral-service merchandise, including caskets,292 must
282. Id.
283. Id. at *4.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at *1.
288. The plaintiffs operated an internet company that sold caskets within the state through
an in-state server and did not have a physical store. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208,
1213 n.9 (10th Cir. 2004). The parties and the court assumed that the server’s location in the
state was sufficient to render it the internet company’s place of business, and thus subject to
Oklahoma state regulation. See id.
289. Id. at 1211.
290. Id. At the district court level, the plaintiffs also argued that the Oklahoma Funeral
Services Licensing Act (FSLA) violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 1214
n.11. The Tenth Circuit confirmed that given the district court’s findings of fact, the
doctrine was inapplicable, and furthermore, that the claim was waived as plaintiffs did not
assert it on appeal. See id. For an argument that the funeral regulations are unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause, see Agarwal & Ellig, supra note 188.
291. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1211.
292. See id. at 1212 n.1 (explaining that funeral-service merchandise, as defined by the
FSLA, includes “the sale of burial supplies and equipment, but excluding the sale by a
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be a licensed funeral director293 operating out of a funeral establishment.294
Thus, in order to sell caskets in the state, the FSLA “effectively requires
that both a funeral director’s license and a funeral establishment license be
obtained from the Board before a person or entity may lawfully sell
caskets.”295 Notably, Oklahoma does not apply the licensing scheme to
those who sell other funeral related merchandise, such as “urns, grave
markers, monuments, clothing and flowers.”296 In addition, the licensing
requirements only apply to time-of-need sales, leaving unlicensed
individuals free to sell pre-paid297 or pre-death caskets as long as they are
acting as an agent of a licensed funeral director.298 Lastly, the Board only
enforces the law with respect to intrastate casket sales.299 Plaintiffs wished
to sell in-state, time-of-need caskets in Oklahoma over the internet, but had
not done so out of fear that the Board would prosecute them for violating
the Board rules.300
Plaintiffs argued that the FSLA violates both equal protection and
substantive due process. In addressing the plaintiffs’ challenge, the court
noted that the proper level of review was rational basis review because the
case concerned “a state economic regulation that does not affect a
fundamental right and categorizes people on the basis of a non-suspect
classification.”301 The court further decided that the plaintiff’s claim was
“most properly presented as an equal protection claim” since the plaintiffs
cited mostly equal protection cases—even when making substantive due
process arguments—and the Supreme Court itself has most often analyzed
regulatory challenges under the Equal Protection Clause.302
The Board argued, and the plaintiffs and court agreed, that protecting
casket purchasers—a vulnerable group—constitutes a legitimate state
interest.303 Since consumer protection was accepted as a legitimate end of
state regulation, the parties urged the court to inquire whether the licensing

cemetery of lands or interests therein, services incidental thereto, markers, memorials,
monuments . . . .” (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 396.2(10))).
293. See id. at 1211 n.2 (“The FSLA defines a funeral director as ‘a person who: sells
funeral service merchandise to the public . . . .’” (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 59,
§ 396.2(2)(d))).
294. See id. at 1211.
295. Id. at 1212 n.4 (citing Powers v. Harris, No. CIV-01-445-F, 2002 WL 32026155, at
*11 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2002)).
296. Id. at 1212.
297. The Oklahoma Insurance Code and Insurance Commissioner regulate sales of
caskets on a pre-paid basis. See id. at 1212 n.6 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 6121).
298. Id. at 1212 & n.5.
299. Id. at 1212 (“[A]n unlicensed Oklahoman may sell a time-of-need casket to a
customer outside of Oklahoma . . . and an unlicensed salesperson who is not located in
Oklahoma may sell a time-of-need casket to a customer in Oklahoma.”).
300. Id. at 1213.
301. Id. at 1215.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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scheme was rationally related to that end.304 The Board admitted that its
licensure requirements were not perfectly aligned with its goal of consumer
protection but argued that they met the required “fit” under rational basis
review.305 Importantly, the Board noted that the licensing scheme was not
“wholly irrelevant”306 since all the witnesses who testified agreed that those
purchasing time-of-need caskets were a particularly vulnerable group due to
the grief that arises from death and, as a result, were susceptible to
aggressive sales tactics.307
However, rather than address the question presented by the parties—
whether the FSLA was rationally related to the legitimate interest of
consumer protection—the court, sua sponte, after concluding that it was
obligated308 to examine every possible legitimate interest including those
not advanced by the parties, decided to consider whether “protecting the
intrastate funeral home industry, absent a violation of a specific
constitutional provision or a valid federal statute, constitutes a legitimate
state interest.”309 The court then proceeded to analyze whether economic
protectionism can be a legitimate state interest, noting that if it is, the
licensing arrangement was undoubtedly well-tailored to that end, thus easily
passing rational basis review.310
Addressing the arguments advanced by Craigmiles, the court pointed out
that all of the cases relied on were those addressing interstate, as opposed to
intrastate commerce, and thus inapposite.311 For example, the Powers
court criticized Craigmiles’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey312 decision, since that case involved a New
Jersey law that prohibited importing waste that originated outside of the
state.313

304. Id. The urge to protect grieving family members surrounding funerals also finds
fruition in tort law, where during the late nineteenth century an exception to the general rule
against recovery for pure emotional harm existed that permitted family members to recover
for their emotional distress occurring during or in conjunction with funeral preparations. See
JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 721–22 (2d ed. 2008) (citing Mentzer v. W. Union Tel. Co.,
62 N.W. 1 (Iowa 1895)); see also Gregory C. Keating, Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress a Freestanding Tort?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1159 n.78 (2009).
305. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1216 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993)).
306. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993) (“A statutory classification fails
rational-basis review only when it ‘rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of
the State’s objective.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S.
60, 71 (1978))).
307. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1216 (citing Powers v. Harris, No. CIV-01-445-F, 2002 WL
32026155, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2002)).
308. See id. at 1217 (citing Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 253 F.3d 137, 146 (1st Cir.
2001)).
309. Id. at 1218.
310. See id. (citing Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 2002)).
311. See id. at 1219–21.
312. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
313. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1219.
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As Powers explained, the distinction between intrastate and interstate
commerce is relevant, since the policies behind—as well as the textual hook
of—the Dormant Commerce Clause cases do not apply to intrastate
commerce analyzed under the Equal Protection or Due Processes
Clauses.314 The state-promulgated economic protectionist regulation the
Dormant Commerce Clause forbids is that which protects a state from
competition in the larger national economy.315 As the Tenth Circuit pointed
out, “[o]ur country’s constitutionally enshrined policy favoring a national
marketplace is simply irrelevant as to whether a state may legitimately
protect one intrastate industry as against another when the challenge to the
statute is purely one of equal protection.”316 Thus, the Tenth Circuit
reasoned that only by engaging in “selective quotation”317 from interstate
commerce cases could the Craigmiles court have concluded that the
Supreme Court had weighed in on the issue.
The Powers court ultimately found that “intra-state economic
protectionism, absent a violation of a specific federal statutory or
constitutional provision, is a legitimate state interest”318 and, therefore, it
undoubtedly passes rational basis review.319 To reach this conclusion, the
court focused its analysis on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Fitzgerald v.
Racing Association of Central Iowa,320 New Orleans v. Dukes,321 and Lee
Optical.322
Fitzgerald involved an equal protection challenge by racetrack gambling
institutions to the preferential tax rates afforded riverboat gambling and
racetrack gambling casinos.323 The Supreme Court upheld the tax scheme,
finding “help[ing] the riverboat industry” to be a legitimate state goal.324 In
Dukes, the Supreme Court upheld a New Orleans ordinance that prohibited
the selling of foodstuffs from pushcarts in the French Quarter, yet allowed
those who had been selling food out of such carts for at least eight years to
continue operating, thus reducing the number of pushcart operators to
two.325 As the Powers court discussed,326 the Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that the New Orleans ordinance violated the Equal
314. See id. at 1220.
315. See id. at 1219.
316. See id. at 1220.
317. See id. at 1219.
318. Id. at 1222. The Powers court believed such a conclusion reflected Supreme Court
precedent. See id. at 1220 (“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently held that protecting or
favoring one particular intrastate industry, absent a specific federal constitutional or statutory
violation, is a legitimate state interest.”).
319. Id. at 1219–23 (“There can be no serious dispute that the FSLA is ‘very well
tailored’ to protecting the intrastate funeral-home industry.” (quoting Craigmiles v. Giles,
312 F.3d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 2002))).
320. 539 U.S. 103 (2003).
321. 427 U.S. 297 (1967).
322. See infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
323. See Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. 103 (2003).
324. Id. at 110.
325. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 305.
326. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Protection Clause by creating “a protected monopoly for the favored class
member[s],”327 reasoning that the ordinance might have been implemented
to stimulate tourism in the French Quarter.328 Thus, it was legitimate for
the city to eliminate vendors in the heart of the French Quarter, as failing to
do so might have reduced tourism and thus harm the city’s economy.329
The Powers court then took a direct jab at the Craigmiles court, noting
that Craigmiles focused on the “actual motives of the Tennessee
Legislature,” into which the Supreme Court has foreclosed inquiry.330 The
court further attacked the Craigmiles court for equating the funeral-industry
licensing scheme to the schemes at issue in the decisions that analyzed
statutes under the rational-basis plus standard, such as Romer.331 The
majority opinion concluded by noting that a bill to amend the FLSA to
favor unlicensed casket retailers has been introduced three times, but never
made it past the committee stage.332
Judge Tymkovich’s concurrence in Powers argued that the legislative
scheme met the rational basis test and agreed with the majority that some
courts have upheld regulations that favor some economic interest over
others, but parted company with the majority in its belief that the cases
relied upon by the majority “rest on a fundamental foundation: the
discriminatory legislation arguably advances either the general welfare or a
public interest.”333 The concurrence argued that the Supreme Court has
always required a public interest be served when a regulation appears to
advance one group’s interest over another’s.334 Thus, the concurrence
rejected what it perceived as the majority’s per se approval of intrastate
protectionist legislation.335
III. UNEARTHING THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND RECOGNIZING ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM OF AN IN-STATE INDUSTRY AS A
LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST
This Part asserts that the court in Powers was correct in holding that
naked intrastate economic protectionism, absent a federal statutory or
constitutional violation, should be recognized as a legitimate state interest.
Part III first argues that the actual purpose behind the casket licensing
schemes is most likely to protect the funeral services industry from
327. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted).
328. See id. at 304–05.
329. See id.
330. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1223 (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307
(1993)).
331. See id. at 1224–25.
332. See id. at 1225 (“While these failures may lead Plaintiffs to believe that the
legislature is ignoring their voices of reason, the Constitution simply does not guarantee
political success.”).
333. Id. (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
334. See id. at 1225–26 (noting, for example, that in Fitzgerald the Court couched its
protection of river-boat operators as an effort to preserve economic prosperity).
335. See id. at 1226.
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competition, but that the Craigmiles court incorrectly ratcheted up judicial
review by aligning itself with Romer and Cleburne and looking into the
actual purpose and motivation behind the legislation. Similarly, this Part
argues that the Craigmiles court erred when it cited Commerce Clause cases
in a conclusory manner to support its assertion that the Supreme Court has
held that economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest.
This part next contends that the Tenth Circuit in Powers did not follow
Supreme Court precedent since it made explicit the Supreme Court’s
implicit acceptance of economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest.
However, this part continues to argue that Powers reached the correct
outcome in upholding the licensing requirement because rational basis
review requires a very high level of deference to legislative enactments.
Ultimately, this part argues that the Supreme Court, if it decides to hear
this issue, should recognize pure economic protectionism of an in-state
industry as a legitimate state interest, precisely because economic
protectionism itself may promote the public good. By relying on Dukes and
Fitzgerald, the Powers decision implicitly makes this argument,
determining that states may rationally believe that protecting a particular
industry from competition benefits the general population of the state.
Lastly, this part addresses arguments against recognizing in-state economic
protectionism as a legitimate state interest.
A. The Purpose of the State Funeral Regulations Is Likely To Benefit
Special Interests
This section argues that the state casket-sales regulations likely reflect the
actual product of interest group rent seeking. The next section shows
however, why such a conclusion is irrelevant under current rational basis
review, and thus the Craigmiles court was incorrect in striking down the
regulations.
The true purpose of the regulations is likely protectionism of the funeral
services industry, because they do not actually advance any of the other
purported state interests. For example, they do not further the interest of
preventing groundwater leakage because in Louisiana and Tennessee, there
are no regulations that mandate the specifications of a casket.336 Rather, a
purchaser in Tennessee or Louisiana is free to choose any casket to use at
burial.337 In fact, in Louisiana no regulation mandates the use of a casket at
all for burial.338 It is not illegal for a body to be buried directly in the
ground.339 If the actual motivation behind these regulations concerned
groundwater leakage, these states could pass laws requiring the use of
caskets at burial, and require stringent casket specifications.340 Thus, due to
the lack of regulations detailing which type of caskets must be used, the
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See supra notes 254–57, 281–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 255, 282 and accompanying text.
See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
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states are likely not actually trying to regulate in order to protect their
citizens from groundwater contamination.341
They also do not further other legitimate state interests because as the
current regulations stand, a citizen of Oklahoma is free to purchase a casket
from anyone—be it a monk, a non–funeral director retailer, or even
Walmart’s website—as long as that person does not operate out of their
home state.342 If the state was actually concerned about the quality of
caskets sold or wanted its casket-sales people to have sufficient griefcounseling training, the regulations would reflect these concerns.343 If
these states actually believed that people selling funeral merchandise should
be trained in grief counseling, such training could be mandated for all
funeral operators—something that it is not currently required. The
regulations therefore do not further that purported state interest.
Similarly, the argument that the state seeks to protect consumers by
restricting casket sales to funeral directors because the FTC’s Funeral Rule
only applies to funeral directors and not third-party retailers, is also not
likely the actual motivation behind the regulations.344 The FTC contends
that the Louisiana regulations frustrate the purposes of the Funeral Rule.345
The purpose of the Funeral Rule is to increase transparency in pricing and
to foster competition in the industry.346 The FTC has found that third-party
casket retailers do not pose harm to competition, but rather improve
competition by expanding consumer choice.347 Furthermore, the evidence
suggests that third-party retailers are not prone to abuses such as bundling,
since announcing their (usually lower) prices helps them compete in the
industry.348 Third-party retailers are not unconstrained from abusive
practices, since the FTC can bring an enforcement action under section 5 of
the FTC Act for false or misleading statements or unfair marketing, and
traditional unfair competition and tort and contract remedies remain
available.349 Thus, as stressed by the FTC, the third-party casket sellers do
not actually pose a threat to consumer protection.

341. See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 303–07 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text; see also Brief for the FTC As
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 14, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756
(5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2011) (“[T]here is no merit to the argument . . . that, because the Funeral
Rule does not itself cover independent casket retailers, only licensed funeral directors should
be able to sell caskets.”).
345. See Brief for the FTC As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 15–16, St.
Joseph Abbey, No. 11-30756.
346. See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
349. See Brief for the FTC As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 15, St. Joseph
Abbey, No. 11-30756.
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B. Craigmiles: Incorrect in Engaging in More Searching Review and
Relying on Dormant Commerce Clause Cases
The Sixth350 and Tenth351 Circuits and the Eastern District of
Louisiana352 agree that the purpose behind the casket-sales restriction was
pure economic protectionism.353 However, the courts differed about
whether this was a legitimate state interest. Unlike the court in Teague,
which concluded that the Virginia licensing scheme furthered the public
purpose of ensuring competency in funeral arrangement,354 the Sixth
Circuit and the Eastern District of Louisiana recognized that the purpose the
respective state licensing schemes effectuated was protecting the in-state
funeral services industry, which they found illegitimate.355
However, looking to the actual purpose behind legislative enactments has
no place in rational basis review.356 Rather, rational basis review only
requires hypothetical or theoretical justifications for a law and does not
require that the law actually be passed for that purpose.357 The following
subsection explains why Craigmiles and St. Joseph Abbey erred by ignoring
such hypothetical rationales and utilizing heightened rational basis “with
bite.”358
This Part argues that courts should not rely on interstate commerce cases
or rational basis “with bite” cases when analyzing economic regulations
under the Equal Protection or the Due Process Clauses. Part III.B.1 asserts
that the Court’s decisions in Romer and Cleburne do not support applying a
more searching form of rational basis review to economic licensing
regulations. Part III.B.2 argues that interstate commerce cases are
inapposite and dubious precedent for intrastate commerce causes.
1. Romer and Cleburne Are Not Applicable for Casket Licensing
The Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles improperly applied a more searching
standard than traditional rational basis by citing the Romer and Cleburne
The Sixth Circuit followed such an approach by
decisions.359
acknowledging that in order for a statute to be invalidated under rational
basis review, it must reek of “the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated

350. See supra notes 244–46 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
353. Cf. supra note 270 (describing lobbying efforts by the funeral industry).
354. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
355. See supra Part II.B–C.
356. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text; see also Briana J. Gorod, Case
Note, Does Lochner Live?: The Disturbing Implications of Craigmiles v. Giles, 21 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 537 (2003) (discussing Craigmiles’ inappropriate reliance on Cleburne’s
heightened standard of review).
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dead fish.”360 The Sixth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Romer and Cleburne as examples of statutes that have risen to that level of
“pungence.”361 However, the Sixth Circuit erred in holding the Tennessee
regulation subject to this same level of scrutiny.
The Romer and Cleburne decisions, while purportedly using rational
basis review, involved a more searching level of review than typically
applied.362 This was because the Court perceived the laws to be motivated
at least in part by discrimination, and aimed at a “bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group” and thus looked into the actual reason behind
the law.363 In contrast, the casket licensing restrictions are not motivated by
animus or discrimination against a politically unpopular group.364 Rather,
they are economic regulations, which like all licensing schemes harm those
that do not have the time, money, or ability to gain the requisite credentials
to be eligible for a license.365 This group cannot be deemed a historically
politically unpopular group to the extent of homosexuals or the mentally ill.
This is a far cry from the type of “pungence” required to invalidate a law
using rational basis review. Thus, the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles was
incorrect in elevating its standard of review and inquiring into the actual
motivation behind the legislation as the Supreme Court did in Cleburne and
Romer.
2. Mistaking the Intrastate for the Interstate
In addition to unjustifiably using rational basis “with bite” cases for
support, the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles improperly relied on cases having
to do with interstate, as opposed to intrastate, commerce in reaching its
conclusion that intrastate economic protectionism is not a legitimate state
interest.366
The policy behind preventing interstate economic protectionism is to
prevent barriers to the development and maintenance of a national
marketplace.367 Furthermore, the textual hook for interstate economic
protectionism’s unconstitutionality derives from the enumerated right of the

360. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted)
(quoting United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434, 447 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also supra note 247
and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 156–59, 246–50 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
364. See supra Part II.
365. If a monopoly results, such regulations may also potentially hurt consumers through
higher prices. Cf. supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text. But see supra note 198 and
accompanying text (discussing how the “one-monopoly-rent” hypothesis suggests that
consumers are not harmed by state casket-sale restrictions). In any event, the presence of
potentially harmed consumers does not turn an economic licensing scheme into a
discriminatory scheme aimed to harm a politically unpopular group.
366. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
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federal government over interstate commerce.368 Thus, the Supreme Court
precedent on interstate economic protectionism does not support a finding
that intrastate economic protectionism of a wholly in-state industry is a
legitimate state interest under the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses.369
C. Powers: Correct in Upholding the Licensing Scheme
While Powers was correct in upholding the licensing scheme, it made a
jurisprudential error by making explicit what courts applying rational basis
review often implicitly do, which is to uphold purely protectionist
regulations. Stated differently, the court in Powers erred in not paying lip
service to a more general conception of the health and safety rationale of
the traditional police powers, even though the outcome of the case was
correctly decided. What the Powers court should have done to align itself
with explicit Supreme Court precedent was follow the courts’ approaches in
Teague and Stone Casket.
1. Supreme Court Precedent: Requirement That Regulations Be Passed for
Public Purposes
The Tenth Circuit in Powers diverged from explicit Supreme Court
precedent by holding that the state had a legitimate interest in aiming to
benefit the funeral services industry by awarding it a regulatory monopoly
in casket sales.370 Supreme Court precedent reveals that even in West
Coast Hotel371 and the deferential cases following it, such as Lee Optical,
the Court has tethered its decisions to finding that the state could have
rationally concluded that it was using its traditional police powers to
advance the public health, safety, or some other neutral goal372 for the
general public.373
As the concurrence in Powers argued, the majority in Powers departed
from the traditional application of equal protection and due process analysis
under rational basis review, where the legitimate state interest discussion
focuses on whether the state is aiming to serve the general public and not
arbitrarily awarding benefits or harming individuals.374

368.
text.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also supra notes 314–15 and accompanying
See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text.
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2. Rational Basis’s Deferential Approach Suggests That the Powers Court
Was Correct in Upholding the Regulation
There is a rift between what the Supreme Court says it does (which is
require some traditional public purpose for regulations to be legitimate),
and what it actually does, which is uphold patently protectionist
regulations.375 For example, in Lee Optical, the law was most likely a
protectionist law aimed at protecting business for optometrists and
ophthalmologists, and yet the Court upheld the law, finding it a legitimate
exercise of police power, and thus not a violation of the Due Process
Clause.376
This rift occurs due to the very deferential standard judges apply when
reviewing such legislation. Under traditional rational basis review, the
actual motivation behind the law is irrelevant, as any conceivable—
even hypothetical—set of facts will support a finding of constitutionality.377
Thus, under traditional rational basis review, the restrictive casket-sale
regulations should have been upheld. It is certainly conceivable that the
legislatures believed that restricting casket sales to funeral directors
protected against leaky caskets, regardless of the fact that if this was their
chief concern, they could have passed a more narrowly tailored law. The
legislature could also have rationally concluded that mandating casket sales
through funeral directors would encourage more people to buy a casket, and
thus lower ground contamination.
It is also conceivable that the state legislators took a different view than
the FTC and deemed that by not being covered by the Funeral Rule against
deceptive practices, third-party retailers could harm consumers by selling
cheap, but low quality caskets that might cause emotional harm to
consumers.378 Thus, the State may have a legitimate interest in protecting
grieving families from the emotional distress incidental to purchasing a

375. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting that Lee Optical in all likelihood
involved a protectionist law); see also Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the
Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 898, 905 (2005) (“[T]here is a yawning chasm
between the Court’s rhetoric, which still refers—accurately—to occupational freedom as a
constitutional right, and the Court’s holdings, which no longer provide any meaningful
protection for that right and instead permit legislators to trample and abuse the right with
near total impunity.” (emphasis omitted)).
376. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
378. It is not inconceivable that a poor quality casket could result in severe emotional
harm to grieving relatives. See Baynes v. George E. Mason Funeral Home, Inc., No. 3:09CV-153, 2011 WL 2181469, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (“[The] funeral director . . . called . . .
with some tragic news, and told him that the casket containing Trey’s remains had ‘failed.’
. . . [resulting in a] sight that was an affront to the most fundamental dignity of human
nature; the casket was deteriorating, corroding, rusting, and leaking a blue fluid. The
casket also emitted a horrendous odor. [The plaintiff] learned that the bronze casket he had
purchased was in fact made of steel.”); Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket Co., 438 F. Supp. 906,
908 (D. Mont. 1977) (finding that mental anguish reasonably resulted when a deceased
family member’s leak-proof casket leaked).
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shoddy casket.379 Since the practice of requiring only a hypothetical
justification is extremely deferential to states, the Tenth Circuit in Powers
was correct in upholding the casket-sales restriction.
D. Unearthing the Public Interest: Why Economic Protectionism Should
Be Deemed a Legitimate State Interest
Current substantive due process and equal protection review of licensing
restrictions remains extremely deferential to a state’s purported justification
for using its police power.380 This deference reflects the federal judiciary’s
unwillingness to second-guess the legislative will of democratically elected
state legislatures.381 However, while courts have shown great deference to
states’ purported justifications for laws, they still require the law’s
purported purpose to fit into the liberal police power paradigm.382 Thus, in
order for a law to be legitimate, it must at least pay lip service to the
advancement of the traditional conception of the health, safety, or general
welfare of the public.383 Instead of keeping up this inequitable charade,384
courts should explicitly broaden their conception of the police powers.
Therefore, courts should redefine their understanding of the police powers
in light of post–New Deal jurisprudence and acknowledge economic
protectionism as a legitimate state interest.
1. Post–New Deal Conception of the Public-Private Divide Supports
Economic Protectionism As a Legitimate State Interest
In the post–New Deal era, the Court’s conception of the public-private
divide has shifted.385 While previously very suspicious of legislative
impulses to regulate in spheres traditionally deemed private, such as an
employer’s contract terms with its employees, the Court in West Coast
Hotel signaled a shift in its conception of the baseline, viewing employeremployee relations as sufficiently public to justify legislative
intervention.386

379. Cf. supra note 303 and accompanying text.
380. See supra Part I.B.3, I.C.2–3.
381. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
382. See supra Part I.A.1, I.C.2.
383. Cf. Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State Interest? Four
Recent Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1036–39 (2006)
(using Lockean and Madisonian conceptions of government power to determine which
statutes are legitimate).
384. The inequality stems from the fact that it creates a two-tiered system of rational basis
review, one which endorses those protectionist laws which can be tethered, however
disingenuously, to a public purpose, while condemning those laws that lack the fortune of
being convincingly tied to a public purpose.
385. See Part I.B.3.
386. See Part I.B.3. A similar impulse can be identified long before the New Deal in
Munn, which viewed activities “affected with the public interest” to include those not
typically deemed sufficiently public, such as natural monopolies or common pools problems,
to justify the exertion of the police powers. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
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Throughout most of constitutional history, what constitutes a legitimate
state interest has been conceived of by drawing on the classical liberal
tradition that the Constitution is grounded in.387 In determining what
constitutes a legitimate state interest, courts have largely interpreted the
police powers in terms of the classical liberal tradition, where, under a
Lockean understanding, state legislative power was only valid if it aimed to
solve a collective action problem or to regulate a natural monopoly.388
However, in the post–New Deal world, automatic resort to using the
political philosophy of the founding to determine the contours of the police
power raises the same sort of countermajoritarian difficulties that caused the
Court to abandon Lochner-era laissez-faire constitutionalism back in
1937.389 Rather, in the modern era, courts should defer to legislative
majorities’ conception of the political philosophy they wish to apply when
measuring which state interests are legitimate.
This solves the
countermajoritarian dilemma and echoes the strands of populist thought
found in Holmes’s dissent in Lochner.390
This approach would allow states to regulate to effectuate broader public
ends than conceived of under classic police powers. For example,
economic protectionism of an in-state industry should be viewed as
sufficiently general to justify legislating toward that end. As evidenced in
Dukes and Fitzgerald, a state may have a perfectly valid public reason for
protecting an in-state industry, even one that maintains an in-state
monopoly.391 Protecting the river boat gambling industry or the food-cart
sellers was legitimate, because protecting those in-state industries from
competition could conceivably help the general population of the state
through either higher tax revenues or through more tourism to the state.392
Thus the Supreme Court should make explicit its implicit recognition that
aiming to protect or assist an in-state industry is a legitimate state interest393

387. Cf. Sandefur, supra note 164, at 497 (“A law may accomplish any purpose within
the boundaries of ‘legitimate state interests.’ Those boundaries can only be set by political
philosophy.”). Sandefur argues that, in determining what political philosophy to apply,
courts should turn to the American founding as their guide, which Sandefur believes abhors
“naked preferences.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
388. See supra Part I.A.1.
389. See supra Part I.B.3.
390. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
391. See supra notes 320–29 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 328–29 and accompanying text.
393. For scholars who disagree with this conclusion, see Asheesh Agarwal, Protectionism
As a Rational Basis? The Impact on E-commerce in the Funeral Industry, 3 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 189, 217 (2007); Timothy Sandefur, The Right To Earn a Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207
(2003); Simpson, supra note 168, at 202–03; Jim Thompson, Powers v. Harris: How the
Tenth Circuit Buried Economic Liberties, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 585, 600 (2005); Lana
Harfoush, Comment, Grave Consequences for Economic Liberty: The Funeral Industry’s
Protectionist Occupational Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why It Matters, 5 J.
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135, 159 (2001); Hood, supra note 176, at 465–75 (arguing
for increased judicial review for economic regulations by using Macey’s cannon of statutory
construction); Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation Through Burial: How
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precisely because it has the potential to affect the general welfare of the
state.
2. Counterarguments Do Not Persuasively Alter This Conclusion
Finding pure economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest may
result in the establishment and maintenance of certain in-state monopolies
and drive up the prices for consumers.394 However, Supreme Court
precedent has stated that courts should not impose a particular economic
theory on the states.395 Requiring states to outlaw regulations that through
taxation or occupational licensing schemes award benefits to certain in-state
classes, would invalidate a wide range of legislation and pose a slippery
slope problem, as the Powers court noted.396 Making it unconstitutional for
a state to protect a particular industry through regulation goes against the
federalism and judicial-activism concerns underpinning the Court’s
economic substantive due process jurisprudence since the demise of
Lochner.397
Applying interest group theory fails to persuasively alter the conclusion
that pure economic protection of an in-state industry should be a legitimate
state interest.398 Federalism concerns would attach to finding intrastate
economic protectionism unconstitutional, as such a finding would impose a
normative baseline of efficiency on the states that favor redistribution of
monopoly profits to the consumer over the producer.399 Rather, such a
baseline should be determined by the states. On basic federalism terms, the
federal government’s imposition of its economic theory through the Due
Process Clause on the states is unconstitutional. Rather, these sorts of
concerns are more appropriately addressed by antitrust or unfair
competition laws.
Another argument against finding in-state economic protectionism a
legitimate state interest is that if the handing out of benefits to certain instate actors at the expense of others constitutes a legitimate interest under
current Supreme Court jurisprudence, then the first step of rational basis

Challenging Casket Regulations Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in
Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668, 692–94 (2005).
394. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 393, at 600.
395. See supra Part I.B.3.
396. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting the “wideranging” consequences prohibiting intrastate protectionism would have, and suggesting that
“every piece of legislation . . . aiming to protect or favor one industry or business over
another in the hopes of luring jobs to th[e] state would be in danger.”).
397. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
398. See supra Part I.D.1.
399. See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text. Federal antitrust law takes a
consumer-centric view, condemning wealth transfers from consumers to producers with
sufficient market power, even when at the expense of efficiency. See generally, Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
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review is wholly unnecessary.400 Rather, courts would simply ask whether
the law was rationally related to protecting that interest and, as the court in
Powers noted, the casket sales restrictions are very well tailored to the end
of protecting funeral establishments from competition.401 Thus, the
argument goes that such a finding would in effect write federal review of
economic regulations out of the Constitution, causing separation of powers
concerns.402
However, this conclusion overblows the effect of such a finding. While
such a construction would allow economic protectionist legislation to stand,
it would not completely end federal review of state economic regulations.
For example, if a regulation cannot even be tethered to economic
protectionism, but is instead clearly just a legislative favor to a particular
corporation or individual, such a law would not be legitimate.
Lastly, recognizing economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest
may in fact restrict entry to some entrepreneurs and, in such regard, impact
their ability to practice the trade or profession of their choosing.403
However, courts should not resort to Lochner-era substantive due process,
or engage in searching review of economic legislation under the Equal
Protection Clause in order to protect the “right to earn a living.”404 The
countermajoritarian reasons behind the retreat from Lochner remain in
effect today. While extremely sympathetic arguments can be made in favor
of recognizing such a fundamental right, the ills posed by not recognizing
such a right could be better addressed through other legal doctrines,
constitutional or otherwise.405 Ultimately, states should be allowed to
experiment with their preferred economic theory,406 and the federal
government should not unduly infringe on the states’ police powers through
the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.

400. See Thompson, supra note 393, at 601 (2005) (“Could a majority now pass a law
enjoining a certain individual or group from participating in a business for any reason at
all?”).
401. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; cf. Sunstein, supra note 77, at 878
(arguing that “[i]f there is no class of impermissible ends, means-ends scrutiny is
incoherent”).
403. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
404. See Sandefur, supra note 164, at 496–503 (advocating for courts to elevate judicial
review under the Equal Protection Clause to protect the right to earn a living by avoiding
speculative rationales for the legislation and requiring a more searching review of the fit
between means and ends).
405. See, e.g., id. at 466–67 (noting that monopolies have been used “as a weapon against
racial minorities or other politically unpopular groups”). If the main concern surrounds
cutting off access to racial and ethnic minorities, these sorts of ills might be better addressed
through a revitalization of the treatment of disparate impact under the Equal Protection
Clause. However, full examination of these issues is outside the scope of this Note.
406. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The courts of appeals are currently split on whether a state can
legitimately proscribe the selling of caskets by all in-state actors except
those licensed as funeral directors. The central debate surrounding these
economic licensing cases is whether economic protectionism of an in-state
industry can be a legitimate state interest. Supreme Court precedent reveals
that in order to exercise their police power legitimately, states must tether
their regulations to a public purpose. However, because of the amount of
deference states are afforded under current economic substantive due
process and equal protection, protectionist legislation can still be
legitimately passed as long as some—albeit theoretical or hypothetical—
benefit could arguably be linked to the public generally. Thus even laws
with the sole purpose and effect of awarding purely private benefits to an
in-state industry can be legitimately enacted. In response, courts should not
require a link to a traditional police power of health, safety, or general
welfare, and instead find that pure economic protectionism of an in-state
industry is a legitimate state interest precisely because the state may
conclude that such a regulation plausibly serves the general public.

